THE

Biſhop of *Worceſter*'s ANSWER TO Mr. *Locke*'s Letter,

Concerning

Some PASSAGES

Relating to his

ESSAY OF *Humane Underſtanding*,

Mention'd in the late Diſcourſe in Vindication of the Trinity.

With a *POSTSCRIPT* in anſwer to ſome Reflections made on that Treatiſe in a late *Socinian* Pamphlet.

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THE

Biſhop of *Worceſter's* Anſwer

TO

Mr. *Locke's* Letter, *&c.*

SIR,

I Have ſeriouſly conſider'd the *Letter* you were pleaſed to ſend me, and I find it made up of two Parts; A *Complaint* of me, and a *Vindication* of your ſelf: To both which I ſhall return as clear and diſtinct on Anſwer, and in as few words, as the matter will permit.

1. As to the *Complaint* of me, it runs quite through the Book, and even your *Poſtſcript* is full of it.

The ſubſtance of it is, that in *anſwering Objections againſt the Trinity, in point of Reaſon*, I produce ſeveral Paſſages out of your *Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, as if they were intended

by you to that Purpoſe; but you declare to the World, *p.* 150. that it was written by you *without any Thought of the Controverſie between the* Trinitarians *and* Unitarians; and *p.* 224. *That your Notions about Ideas have no Connexion with any Objections that are made by others againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, or againſt Myſteries.* And therefore you complain of it, as *an Injury done to you, in imputing that to you, which you have not done,* p. 95. or *at leaſt in leaving it ſo doubtfull, that the Reader cannot diſtinguiſh who is meant,* p. 96. and this you call *my peculiar way of Writing in this part of my Treatiſe.*

Now to give you and others ſatisfaction as to this matter, I ſhall firſt give an account of the *Occaſion* of it, and then ſhew what *Care* I took to prevent Miſunderſtanding about it.

The *Occaſion* was this, Being to anſwer the *Objections in Point of Reaſon,* (which had not been anſwered before) the firſt I mention'd, was, *That it was above Reaſon, and therefore not to be believed*; in anſwer to this, I propoſed two Things to be conſider'd; 1. What we underſtand by Reaſon. 2. What Ground in Reaſon there is to reject any Doctrine

Doctrine above it, when it is propoſed as a matter of Faith.

As to the former I obſerv'd that the *Unitarians* in their late Pamphlets talk'd very much of *clear and diſtinct Ideas and Perceptions*, and that the Myſteries of Faith were repugnant to them, but never went about to ſtate the Nature and Bounds of Reaſon in ſuch a manner as thoſe ought to have done who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe. But I added, that a late Author in a Book, call'd *Chriſtianity not Myſterious*, had taken upon him to clear this Matter, whom for that cauſe I was bound to conſider; the deſign of his Diſcourſe related wholly to *Matters of Faith*, and not to *Philoſophical Speculations*; ſo that there can be no Diſpute about his Application of thoſe he calls *Principles of Reaſon and Certainty*.

When the Mind makes uſe of intermediate Ideas to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas received into them, this Method of Knowledge, he ſaith, *is properly called Reaſon or Demonſtration.*

The Mind, as he goes on, *receives Ideas two ways:*

1. *By Intromiſſion of the Senſes.*
2. *By conſidering its own Operations.*

And theſe ſimple and diſtinct Ideas, are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning.

And ſo *all our Certainty* is reſolved into two things, either *immediate Perception, which is ſelf-Evidence*, or *the uſe of intermediate Ideas, which diſcovers the Certainty of any thing dubious*; which is what he calls *Reaſon.*

Now this I ſaid did ſuppoſe,

" That we muſt have clear and di-
" ſtinct Ideas of what-ever we pretend
" to any Certainty of in our minds (by
" Reaſon) and that the only way to
" attain this Certainty is by comparing
" theſe Ideas together; which excludes
" all Certainty of Faith or Reaſon,
" where we cannot have ſuch clear and
" diſtinct Ideas.

From hence I proceeded to ſhew, that we could not have ſuch *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, as were neceſſary in the preſent Debate, either *by Senſation or Reflection*, and conſequently we could not attain to *any Certainty* about it; for which, I inſtanced in the *Nature of Subſtance* and *Perſon*, and the *Diſtinction* between them.

And

And by vertue of theſe Principles I ſaid, " That I did not wonder, that the " Gentlemen of this new way of Rea- " ſoning had almoſt diſcarded Subſtance " out of the Reaſonable Part of the " World. Which *Expreſſion* you tell me *you do not underſtand.* But if you had pleaſed to have look'd back on the Words juſt before, a Perſon of your Sagacity could not have miſſed the Meaning I intended. Which are, " Now this is the caſe of Subſtance; it " is not intromitted by the Senſes, nor " depends upon the Operations of the " Mind, and cannot be within the " compaſs of our Reaſon.

But you ſay, *That if I mean that you deny or doubt that there is in the World any ſuch thing as Subſtance, I ſhall acquit you of it, if I look into ſome Paſſages in your Book which you refer to.* But this is not the point before us, whether you do own *Subſtance* or not? but whether by vertue of theſe Principles, you can come to any Certainty of Reaſon about it? And I ſay, the very places you produce do prove the contrary; which I ſhall therefore ſet down in your own Words, both as to *Corporeal* and *Spiritual Subſtances.* P. 6.

P. 7. *When we talk or think of any particular ſort of Corporeal Subſtance, as Horſe, Stone,* &c. *tho' the Idea we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple Ideas of ſenſible Qualities which we uſe to find united in the thing called Horſe or Stone, yet becauſe we cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, or one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in and ſupported by ſome common ſubject, which Support we denote by the name Subſtance, tho' it be certain we have no clear or diſtinct Idea of that thing we ſuppoſe a Support. The ſame happens concerning Operations of the Mind,* viz. *Thinking, Reaſoning,* &c. *which we conſidering not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body or be produced by it, we are apt to think theſe the Actions of ſome other Subſtance, which we call Spirit, whereby yet it is evident, that having no other Notion or Idea of Matter, but ſomething wherein thoſe many ſenſible Qualities, which affect our Senſes do ſubſiſt, by ſuppoſing a Subſtance wherein Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and a Power of Moving,* &c. *do ſubſiſt, we have as clear a*

P. 8. *Notion of the Nature or Subſtance of Spirit as we have of Body, the one being ſuppoſed*

poſed to be (*without knowing what it is*) *the* Subſtratum *to thoſe ſimple Ideas we have from without, and the other ſuppoſed* (*with a like Ignorance of what it is*) *to be the* Subſtratum *to thoſe Operations which we experiment in our ſelves.* You mention other places to the ſame purpoſe, but theſe are ſufficient for mine. *Theſe and the like faſhions of ſpeaking,* P. 9. *you ſay intimate, that the Subſtance is ſuppoſed always ſomething,* &c. I grant that you ſay over and over, *that Subſtance is ſuppoſed*; but that is not what I looked for, but ſomething in the way of Certainty by Reaſon. Yes, you ſay, *we cannot conceive how theſe ſenſible Qualities ſhould ſubſiſt alone, and therefore we ſuppoſe a Subſtance to ſupport them.* It is but *ſuppoſing* ſtill, becauſe we cannot conceive it otherwiſe. But what Certainty follows barely from our not *being able to Conceive*? Are there not multitudes of Things which we are not able to conceive, and yet it would not be allowed us to ſuppoſe what we think fit on that account? I could *hardly conceive* that Mr. *L.* would have brought ſuch Evidence as this againſt himſelf; but *I muſt ſuppoſe ſome unknown Subſtratum* in this Caſe.

But

But you go on, *That as long as there is any ſimple Idea, or ſenſible Quality left, according to my way of Arguing, Subſtance cannot be diſcarded, becauſe all ſimple Ideas, all ſenſible Qualities carry with them a ſuppoſition of a Subſtratum to exiſt in and of a Subſtance wherein they inhere.* What is the meaning of *carrying with them a ſuppoſition of a Subſtratum and a Subſtance?* Have theſe *ſimple Ideas* the Notion of a *Subſtance* in them? *No, but they carry it with them.* How ſo? Do *ſenſible Qualities* carry a *Corporeal Subſtance* along with them? Then a *Corporeal Subſtance* muſt be *intromitted* by the Senſes together with them. *No; but they carry the Suppoſition with them.* And truly that is burden enough for them. But which way do they *carry it?* It ſeems it's only *becauſe we cannot conceive it otherwiſe.* What is this *Conceiving?* It may be ſaid that it is *an Act of the Mind, not built on ſimple Ideas, but lies in comparing the Ideas of Accident and Subſtance together, and from thence finding that an Accident muſt carry Subſtance along with it?* But this will not clear it; for the *Ideas* of *Accidents* are *ſimple Ideas*, and carry nothing along with them; but the Impreſ-

ſion

ſion made by ſenſible Objects: and the Idea of *Subſtance* comes in by way of *Suppoſition* with the other, ſo that it is not *the comparing two Ideas together*, but the *ſuppoſing* one *Idea* from another, and that a very *obſcure and confuſed one* too, as is confeſſed, *viz. That it is ſomething which ſupports Accidents*, and was found out for that ſubſtantial End. As appears from theſe remarkable words of yours.

They who firſt ran into the Notion of Accidents, as a ſort of real Beings that needed ſomething to inhere in, were forc'd to find out the word Subſtance to ſupport them. Had the poor Indian *Philoſopher, but thought of this word Subſtance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to ſupport it, and a Tortoiſe to ſupport his Elephant. The word Subſtance would have done it effectually. And it might have been taken for as good an Anſwer from an* Indian *Philoſopher, that Subſtance without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports the Earth, as we take it for a ſufficient Anſwer, and good Doctrine from our* European *Philoſophers, that Subſtance without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports Accidents.* What can be ridiculing the Notion of Subſtance, Book 2. Ch. 13. Sect. 19.

P. 14. ſtance, and *the* European *Philoſophers* for aſſerting it, if this be not? I forbear now your *Repetition* of it; becauſe Ch. 23. Sect. 2. I ſee it doth not pleaſe you. But truly it was not to upbraid you with the bare *Repetition* as a *fault in Writing* (many of which I am too much ſenſible of my ſelf, to blame it in others) but only to ſhew that it was not a ſudden Fancy, but a deliberate, and (as you thought) a lucky Similitude.

P. 11. But you ſay, *You would be glad to hear a clearer and more diſtinct Idea of Subſtance, but you can find no better in your own Thoughts, or in the Books of Logicians.* Are not theſe *Logicians* a ſort of *European Philoſophers*, who were deſpiſed ſo much before, for this very Notion of *Subſtance*? Even *Burgerſdicius* and *Sanderſon* (whom you quote) were ſo, as well as many others of the dull *Tribe of Logicians.*

But I do not find fault with the Definition of *Subſtance* brought by *Logicians*; for they do not ſay, *that it was found out only to ſupport Accidents*, but they ſay, it firſt implies a *Subſiſtence by it ſelf*; and then *that it ſupports Accidents*: But you ſay, *The former implies no more than that Subſtance is a Thing or Being*;

Being ; or in ſhort, ſomething they know not what. Is there no difference between the bare *Being* of a *Thing*, and its *Subſiſtence by it ſelf* ? I had thought *Accidents* or *Modes of Matter* which make ſenſible Impreſſions on us, were *Things* or *Beings* ; or elſe there could be no effect of them, but you will not ſay they *ſubſiſt of themſelves*, and are in no other thing as the proper ſubject of them, and you confeſs at laſt, *that Subſtance doth imply that it is not ſupported it ſelf as a Mode or Accident.* So that our *European Philoſophers* happen to be in the right at laſt.

Well! *but I would think it hard to be thought to diſcard every thing which I do not comprehend ; for I own Myſteries. Why then ſhould I charge others for diſcarding Subſtance, becauſe they have but a confuſed Idea of it.* This is the force of the Charge which I bring into as few words, as may be, but without the leaſt Intention to abate the ſtrength of it. P. 12.

To which I anſwer, That I do not charge them with *diſcarding the Notion of Subſtance*, becauſe they have but an *imperfect Idea* of it ; but becauſe upon thoſe Principles there can be no *certain Idea* at all of it, whereas I aſſert it to be

one

one of the moſt *natural* and *certain Ideas* in our Minds, becauſe it is a Repugnance to our firſt conception of Things that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves; and therefore I ſaid the Rational Idea of Subſtance is one of the firſt Ideas in our Minds; and however imperfect and obſcure our Notion be, yet we are as certain that Subſtances are and muſt be, as that there are any Beings in the World. *Herein* you
P. 22. tell me *you agree with me, and therefore you hope this is no Objection againſt the Trinity.* I never thought it was, but to lay all Foundation of Certainty as to matters of Faith upon *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, which was the Opinion I oppoſed, does certainly overthrow all *Myſteries of Faith*, and excludes the Notion of *Subſtance* out of *Rational Diſcourſe*, which at length you apprehend to have been my meaning.

P. 35. But, ſay you, *if any aſſert, that we can have no Ideas but from Senſation or Reflection, you declare, that this is not your Opinion.* I am very glad of it: And I will do you all the Right I can in this matter. But we muſt take your *Meaning* from your own words. And there are three Particulars you expreſs it in.

(1.) *That*

(1.) *That your Meaning was, to ſignifie all thoſe Complex Ideas of Modes, Relations, and ſpecifick Subſtances, which the Mind forms out of ſimple Ideas.* So that theſe *Ideas* are allowed by you although they come not by *Senſation or Reflection.* But is not the Notion of *particular Subſtances* a *Complex Idea*, becauſe it is a *Complication of ſimple Ideas*, as will preſently appear from your own words; but all *ſimple Ideas come in by Senſation and Reflection.* But you may ſay *the Combination of them to make one Idea, is an Act of the Mind, and ſo this Idea is not from Senſation or Reflection.* It ſeems then, the Mind hath a Power to form *one Complex Idea* out of many *ſimple ones*, and this makes a true Idea of a *particular Subſtance* not coming in by *Senſation* or *Reflection.* But I am ſtill to ſeek, how this comes to make an *Idea of Subſtance*; I underſtand it very well to be a *Complex Idea of ſo many Accidents* put together; but I cannot underſtand, how a *Complex Idea of Accidents* ſhould make an *Idea of Subſtance.* And till you do this you are as far as ever from a *true Idea* of *Subſtance*, notwithſtanding your *Complex Ideas.* P. 25.

(2.) *You*

(2.) *You never ſaid that the general*
P. 38. *Idea of Subſtance comes in by Senſation or Reflection.* And if there be any Expreſſions that ſeem to aſſert it to be *by a Complication of ſimple Ideas*, (*and not by Abſtracting and Inlarging them*) be-
P. 28, 29. *cauſe we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe a Subſtratum*; it ought to be look'd on *as a ſlip of the Pen, or a Negligence of Expreſſion.* In which Caſes, I think no Man ought to be ſevere. But was there not too much occaſion given for others to think, that the *Idea* of particular *Subſtance* was only a *Complication of ſimple Ideas*; and becauſe *all ſimple Ideas do come in*, you ſay, *only by Senſation and Reflection*, therefore all the *Ideas of particular Subſtance* (which is but a *Complication* of them) muſt either come in thoſe ways, or elſe we can have no true Idea of particular *Subſtance* at all?

So that there are Two things, wherein you are very far from giving Satisfaction.

P. 32. 1. That although you ſay, *That the Idea of Subſtance in general is made by Abſtraction*; yet you add, *That all the Ideas we have of particular diſtinct Subſtances are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple Ideas.* From whence it

is

is plain, that according to your repeated Aſſertions, we can have no *Idea* of *particular and diſtinct Subſtances*, but what is made up of a Complication of *ſimple Ideas*: and although there may be ſome abſtracted Notion or *general Idea of Subſtance*, which is only an act of the Mind, yet there is no real Idea of any particular Subſtance, but what is a Complication of ſimple Ideas. *And that a Man hath no other Idea of any Subſtance, let it be Gold or Horſe, Iron, Man, Vitriol, Bread, but what he has barely of thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which he ſuppoſes to inhere with a ſuppoſition of ſuch a Subſtratum, as gives as it were a ſupport to thoſe Qualities or ſimple Ideas, which he has obſerved to exiſt united together.* Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 6. Theſe are your own words; and what can the meaning of them be, but that we neither have nor can have any Idea of a *particular Subſtance*, but only with reſpect to the *ſimple Ideas* which make it up; and theſe being *ſenſible Qualities*, there is no ſuch thing as an *Idea of Subſtance*, but only a *ſuppoſition* of a *Subſtratum to ſupport Accidents.*

2. *That although the Idea of Subſtance be made doubtfull by attributing it only* P. 32.

to our accuſtoming our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome Subſtratum; yet the Being of Subſtance is not. How is this poſſible? Is not the Being *doubtfull* if the *Idea* be; and all our *Certainty* come in by *Ideas*?

P. 33. *No,* ſay you, *the Being would not be ſhaken, if we had no Idea of Subſtance at all.* What! not as to our *Knowledge*? But you ſay, *there are many things in Nature of which we have no Ideas.* And can we have any *Certainty* of Reaſon as to thoſe things? For about that our debate is, *viz.* What *Certainty* we can have as to *Subſtance*, if we can have no *Idea* of it? So that the *Being of Subſtance* on theſe Principles is far from *being ſafe and ſecure* as to us, when we have ſo lame an account of the Idea of it.

But you have yet a farther diſtinction to bring off the *Idea* of *Subſtance*; for you ſay,

P. 40. (3.) *That the Idea of Subſtance is a Relative Idea. For the mind can frame to it ſelf Ideas of Relation, and perceiving that Accidents cannot ſubſiſt of themſelves, but have a neceſſary Connexion with Inherence or being ſupported, which being a Relative Idea, it frames the Correlative of a Support, which is Subſtance.*

And

And now I think we have all that is ſaid in Defence of the *Idea of Subſtance*; *viz.* That there is a *Complex*, *Abſtracted* and *Relative Idea* of it; which is derived from the *ſimple Ideas got by Senſation or Reflection.* But this *Relative Abſtracted Idea* is confeſſed to be *an obſcure, indiſtinct, vague Idea of Thing or Something; and is all that is left to be the poſitive Idea, which hath the Relation of a Support or Subſtratum to Modes or Accidents:* And *that what Idea we have of particular and diſtinct Subſtances is nothing but a Complication of ſimple Ideas with the ſuppoſition of a Subſtratum or Support.*

Theſe being the *Conceſſions* and *Diſtinctions* you make in this Matter, I muſt now return to the *Occaſion* of this Debate, which was, whether the ground of our Certainty, as to the Nature of Subſtance can be reſolved into the *ſimple Ideas* we receive in by *Senſation or Reflection.* The queſtion is not, Whether you *doubt or deny any ſuch Being as Subſtance in the World*? nor whether the Notion you have of it be *clear and diſtinct*? for you confeſs it is not; but the point in debate is, What Certainty we can have of the *Nature* of *Subſtance*

from the *ſimple Ideas* we have by *Senſation or Reflection?* And here the queſtion is not, Whether the mind cannot form *Complex* and *Abſtracted general Ideas* from thoſe *ſimple Ideas?* But whether thoſe *ſimple Ideas are the Foundation of our Knowledge and Certainty as to the Nature of Subſtance?*

For you affirm over and over (if I
P. 18, 23, 24, 36, 37. may have leave to ſay ſo) *That the ſimple Ideas we have by Senſation and Reflection are the Foundation of all our Know-*
P. 8. *ledge.* And yet *that the Ideas we have of particular diſtinct Subſtances are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple Ideas of Accidents.*

Which being ſuppoſed, I think it no hard matter to make it appear that we cannot come to any *Certainty* as to the *Nature* of *Subſtance* in this way of *Ideas.* For,

1. The *ſimple Ideas* afford no ground of Certainty any farther than as to themſelves. Outward Objects make an impreſſion on our Senſes; and all the Certainty we have by them is that our Senſes are ſo and ſo affected by them; but what that is in thoſe Objects which produces thoſe Effects in us, theſe *ſimple Ideas* do not acquaint us. For the old

old or new Doctrine of *Qualities* may be true, notwithſtanding any Effect of theſe *ſimple Ideas* upon us; for the ſame effects would be whether there be *real Qualities in the Objects*, or only a *power to make ſuch Impreſſions* on us, which we fancy to be *Qualities* without us. And ſo for our inward Perceptions; we certainly know, that we have a Power of Thinking, Doubting, Conſidering, *&c.* theſe *ſimple Ideas* we are very certain of; but whether theſe Perceptions come from a *Material* or *Immaterial Subſtance*, you ſay, *cannot be certainly known by theſe ſimple Ideas:* for you think Matter may be ſo refined and modified as to produce them. Now it is a very ſtrange thing to me, that Men of Underſtanding ſhould make theſe *ſimple Ideas the Foundation of all our Knowledge and Certainty*; and yet, that we ſhould be able to attain to no Certainty at all by them, from whence they proceed. For if theſe *Ideas* were intended for the means of our attaining to any Certainty, this would be the firſt thing we ſhould know by them. It is not diſtinguiſhing *Primary* and *Secondary Qualities* will help us out here. For theſe ſenſible Qualities of Bodies, which

ariſe from the firſt, *viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of Parts*, do not carry any evidence along with them that they are not Reſemblances of ſomething in the Objects as well as the Primary. It is very eaſie to affirm, *That there is in Truth nothing in the Objects themſelves, but only Powers to produce various Senſations in us:* but I intend not to diſpute whether it be ſo or not; all that I obſerve, is, that there have been *Philoſophers*, both *European* and others, of another opinion; and that theſe *ſimple Ideas*, which are ſaid to be *the only Foundation of our Knowledge*, do not help us one jot in the Diſcovery. For it is confeſſed by your ſelf, *That Senſation diſcovers nothing of Bulk, Figure or Motion of Parts in the Production of ſenſible Qualities, nor can Reaſon ſhew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure and Motion ſhould produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blew, Tellow*, &c. How then are theſe *ſimple Ideas* the *Foundation of our Knowledge and Certainty*, when by them we can diſcover nothing of the true cauſes of thoſe Impreſſions which are made upon us? And you own, *That the Ideas of Senſation are often corrected by Judgment, and that ſo inſenſibly, that we are apt to miſtake one*

Eſſay, B. 2. ch. 8. Sect. 25.

Ch 9 Sect. 8, 9, 10.

one for the other; ſo that theſe *ſimple Ideas* are but a very ſlippery and uncertain Foundation for our *Knowledge*, unleſs Reaſon and Judgment be watchfull to prevent the Errors we are liable to in the *Ideas* of *Senſation*. But if no more be meant by the *ſimple Ideas that come in by Senſation or Reflection, and their being the Foundation of our Knowledge*, but that our Notions of Things come in either from our Senſes or the Exerciſe of our Minds: As there is nothing extraordinary in the Diſcovery, ſo I am far enough from oppoſing that, wherein I think all Mankind are agreed. But when new Terms are made uſe of by ill men to promote *Scepticiſm* and *Infidelity*, and to overthrow the *Myſteries of our Faith*, we have then Reaſon to enquire into them, and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them. And this was the *true and only Reaſon* of my looking into this way of *Certainty by Ideas*, becauſe I found it *applied* to ſuch Purpoſes.

(2.) *The Idea of particular Subſtances* being only *the Complication of many ſimple Ideas*, can give no greater Foundation of Knowledge or Certainty than thoſe *ſimple Ideas* of which it conſiſts.

Which is ſo clear of it ſelf, that I ſhall not go about to prove it. But that you make the Ideas of *particular Subſtances* to be no other, is plain from the ſeveral places before mention'd, produced by your ſelf in this Book. So that as to the Notion of *particular Subſtances*, we can find no Foundation of Knowledge or Certainty at all from the Ideas. It cannot be denied, that you joyn *the ſuppoſition of a Subſtratum* with this *Complication of ſimple Ideas*; but we muſt take notice that you place the *Idea* of *particular and diſtinct Subſtances* in that *Complication*, and only reſerve the *ſuppoſition* of the *Subſtratum*, as a general confuſed unknown thing, which makes no part of the *Idea*, but is only kept at a dead lift to *ſupport Accidents*. Your words are, *When we talk or think of any particular ſort of Corporeal Subſtance, as Horſe, Stone*, &c. *tho' the Idea we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple Ideas of ſenſible Qualities, we uſe to find united in the thing called Horſe or Stone*: then follows, *Tet we ſuppoſe them exiſting in ſome common Subject*, &c. So that the *Idea* was compleat before the *ſuppoſition*. And again, *Whatever be the*

P. 7,8,10, 30.

P. 6.

P. 8.

the ſecret Nature of Subſtance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular Subſtances are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple Ideas. Can any thing be plainer? Yet there follows, *Co-exiſting in ſuch, though unknown cauſe of their Union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of it ſelf.* Here we have ſtill *an unknown Support*, but made no part of the *Idea* it ſelf. In another place, the *Idea of Subſtance* is ſaid to be *a Complication of many Ideas together, becauſe not imagining how theſe ſimple Ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome Subſtratum which we call Subſtance.* And this is ſaid to be *the Notion of pure Subſtance in general*, and not of any particular Subſtance, which conſiſts in a *Complication only of ſimple Ideas.*

B 2. ch. 23. Sect. 1.

Sect. 2, 3, 4.

(3.) The *Relative Idea* of *Subſtance* ariſing from the *neceſſary Support* of *Accidents* is a mere effect of Reaſon and Judgment, and no effect of any *ſimple Ideas.* For it ariſes from nothing ſuggeſted by the *Ideas* of Senſation or Reflection, but it comes only from the Mind it ſelf. Becauſe, as I ſaid before, it is a Repugnancy to our firſt Conception of Things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. But

which

which of the *ſimple Ideas* is this built upon? You tell me, *You ſay the ſame thing*, and quote theſe Words of yours;

P. 22. *And I ſay, Becauſe we cannot conceive how ſimple Ideas of ſenſible Qualities ſhould ſubſiſt alone, or one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in and ſupported by ſome common Subject.* But you have not told me, how this is founded on the *ſimple Ideas*, which was your main point; *You boaſt*, you ſay, *of my Agreement with you herein:* I wiſh we might as well agree in all other things under Debate; but why did you not inform me, how you came to this, by your *ſimple Ideas*; and what ſteps and progreſs you made in the *Complication of your ſimple Ideas* before you came to it. For truly, I ſhould have found ſome difficulty in it, ſince you make the *Idea of a particular Subſtance a Complication of many ſimple Ideas:* for if it be ſo, how could a *Complication of ſimple Ideas*, which cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves, make the *Idea* of a *Subſtance* which doth ſubſiſt by it ſelf? This looks a little untowardly in the way of *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. But there is no help for it, a *Subſtratum muſt be ſuppoſed to ſupport theſe* unlucky *Accidents*. Let it be ſo then.

then. How came we to know that theſe *Accidents* were ſuch feeble things? What *ſimple Ideas* inform'd you of it? If none, then it is to be hoped there is ſome other way to attain *Knowledge* and *Certainty* in this matter. No; you tell me, there is no need of any other way, but this of *Ideas*. How ſo? Your words are theſe, *The general indetermined Idea of Something, is by the Abſtraction of the mind derived alſo from the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection.* P. 40. But alas! We are not upon the *general indetermined Idea of ſomething*; but upon the *particular Idea of diſtinct Subſtances*, which is granted not to be by *Abſtraction*, but by a *Complication of ſimple Ideas*. So that this is quite off from the matter. But as to your *general abſtracted Idea*, I have ſomething farther to ſay.

(4.) A general *Abſtracted Idea* of *Subſtance* is no *real Subſtance*, nor a *true Idea* of one, if *particular Subſtances* be nothing but a *Complication of ſimple Ideas*. For you ſay, *That the Mind by Abſtraction from the poſitive ſimple Ideas got by Senſation or Reflection comes to the general Relative Idea of Subſtance.* P. 40. If then the *general Idea* be raiſed from the *ſimple*

ple Ideas, and thoſe *ſimple Ideas* make that of *particular* and *diſtinct Subſtances* only by *Complication*, then the *general Idea* of *Subſtance* can be nothing but an *Abſtracted Complication* of theſe *ſimple Ideas*, or elſe it is not by *Abſtraction* from the *ſimple Ideas*. But I do not deny that there is a *general Nature of Subſtance*, which is as *real* as a *general Idea* can be, and it is that, which makes any *particular Subſtance* be what it is in its own Nature without reſpect to Individual Modes and Properties. And although this general Subſtance doth not exiſt of it ſelf, yet it doth really exiſt in the ſeveral Individuals that belong to its kind; and the ſeveral kinds of particular Subſtances are really diſtinguiſhed from each other, not merely by *ſimple Ideas of ſenſible Qualities*, but by their inward Frame and Conſtitution: as the Subſtance of a Man is from that of a Horſe or a Tree. For it is ridiculous to imagine, that theſe really differ from each other only as Individuals of the ſame ſort under the general *Abſtracted Idea* of *Subſtance*. And if there be *Subſtances* of ſeveral kinds really different from each other, an account muſt be given, not only of the *general Notion of a Subſtratum*

ſtratum for Accidents, but of the *ſpecifick Nature* of *different Subſtances*, and wherein the difference of the *unknown Support* lies, as to the Modes and Accidents of their kinds, which I deſpair of ever ſeeing done by the *ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection*. And your ſelf confeſs, *That we have no Idea of Abſtract Subſtance*; and that *by the Complex Idea of ſenſible Qualities, we are as far from the Idea of the Subſtance of Body, as if we knew nothing at all.* B. 2. Ch. 24. Sect. 16.

And now I freely leave the Reader to judge whether this be a tolerable Account of the *Idea of Subſtance* by *Senſation or Reflection*, and whether I deſerve ſo much to be complained of, for expoſing the unreaſonableneſs of laying *the Foundation of all our Certainty and Knowledge upon ſimple Ideas which we receive by Senſation or Reflection.*

But before I proceed further, it will be proper here to take notice how you juſtifie your *Idea of Subſtance* from *the Etymology of the Word*; *which*, ſay you; *is ſtanding under or upholding.* I told you very little weight is to be laid on a bare Grammatical Etymology, when the Word is otherwiſe uſed by the beſt Authors for the *Eſſence* of a thing; and P. 41.

I named *Cicero* and *Quinctilian*; and the Greek Word imports the ſame. But ſtill you ſay, it is derived *à ſubſtando*; and you tell us your opinion, *That if*
P. 44. *we knew the Original of Words, we ſhould be much helped to the Ideas they were firſt applied to and made to ſtand for.* If you mean the *true Ideas of them*, I muſt beg leave to differ in my opinion, and my Reaſon is this, becauſe Words were uſed before men came to form Philoſophical *Notions* or *Ideas* of Things; and therefore they were forced to make uſe of Words applied in another Senſe; or elſe to coin Words on purpoſe to expreſs their own (as *Cicero* often doth, as *Qualities*, *Evidence*, *Comprehenſion*, &c.) So that if *ſubſtare* were uſed in another Senſe before, it doth not follow, that it ought to be ſo, when we enquire into the true *Ideas* of Things. But one of the beſt Criticks of the Latin Tongue in our Age, hath told us, that *ſubſtantia* is ſo called, *quia per ſe ſubſtat*. And *ſubſtare* is uſed by *Terence*, not for *ſtanding under*, but for *being ſtedfaſt*, *Metuo ut ſubſtet hoſpes*. But as to your general Obſervation; I think there are very few Words uſed in the Philoſophical Language of the *Romans*, but what were taken

Voſſ. Etymol. in V. Sto.

taken off from the original Senſe they were applied to; as *Perſona* was firſt taken for a Man in *Maſquerade*, *Genus* for a *Pedegree*, *Species* for a *Sight*, from *Specio, to ſee*, *Virtus* for manly Courage, and diſtinguiſh'd from *Probity*. *Sit virtus etiam non Probitate minor. Ovid. de Pont. l.* 3. And ſo *Anima* was firſt taken for *the Breath in the Body*, as well as *Spiritus*. Thence *Varro* ſaith, *Their Anceſtors, although they eat Leeks and Onions*, yet were *bene animati, had no ill Breath*; and thence *Animam agere* and *efflare*, ſaith *Cicero*; and from *Anima*, he ſaith, came *Animus*, by which they underſtood *the Mind*; *Hinc Animus ad intelligentiam tributus*, ſaith *Varro*: and many others of a like Nature. But I ſhall only add one more, and that is the Name of *Idea*, ſo very often uſed by your ſelf and others of late. I wiſh we had been told *the original uſe of it, and how it was firſt applied*, that we might better judge of the true meaning of it now when ſo much Weight is laid upon it. I find in *Thucydides*, who was an accurate Writer, and underſtood the true Senſe of Words, that an *Idea* is uſed by him for an *Appearance and Shew* without Reality, as when he ſaith, *That the*

Thucyd. l. 6. p. 392. Ed. Ox. & l. 3. p. 184.

the Athenians *in dealing with the* Sicilians, *made uſe of the ſame Idea which they had done before.* Where it can ſignifie nothing but what he calls before a *Pretence.* But when the Philoſophers came to uſe this Word, they applied it to another Senſe; *Plato* made uſe of it to ſignifie the true *Exemplars* or *Models* of Things, according to which the ſeveral ſorts of them were framed and diſtinguiſhed. This Notion he had, as many others, from the *Pythagoreans*, but what they *Myſtically* called *Numbers* he called *Ideas.* But *Idea* in its *original Senſe* from the Etymology of it, is derived from *Seeing*, and ſo the natural Senſe of it is *ſomething Viſible*; from thence it came to ſignifie the *Impreſſion* made in us from our Senſes; and thence it was carried to the *general Notion* of a thing, and from thence by Metaphyſical and abſtracted Speculations to the *Original Exemplars* of particular Eſſences, which were *Simple and Uniform* and not liable to thoſe Changes which viſible Objects are ſubject to. So *Cicero* tells us, *Plato formed his Notion of Idea*, which he would by no means allow to any Repreſentation made by our Senſes, which *are dull, heavy, uncertain and*

Acad. l. 1. 8.

and imperfect either by the Minuteneſs, or Diſtance, or Mutability of the Objects; thence the Philoſophers of his School denied any true grounds of Certainty to be laid in the *Ideas* we have by our Senſes, which can only afford ground for *Probability* (not as to the bare *Objects*) but as to the *Notions* we take from them. But all Knowledge and Certainty was placed in the acts of the Mind (*Scientiam nuſquam eſſe cenſebant niſi in animi notionibus atque rationibus*) *i. e.* in examining and comparing, not the *bare Ideas*, but the *Definitions of things*; and from theſe, judging of the Truth and Certainty of them. And if our *Ideas* of things be *ſo few, ſo ſuperficial, and ſo imperfect* as you confeſs them to be; if we are ſo much to ſeek, as to *the Connexion of Ideas*, and the finding out proper *intermediate Ideas*, I am afraid this way of Certainty by *Ideas* will come to very little at laſt. And ſo *this Agreement and Diſagreement of Ideas* will have the Fate of the *Stoicks Criterion of Truth*, which only multiplied Diſputes, but ended none. Never any men talked more of *Certainty* than they; and they boaſted of their Diſcoveries of the *true grounds* of it: and the queſtion then

was not about a *Criterion* of the *bare Exiſtence of things*; (about which they allow'd the Judgment of the Senſes to be ſufficient, and the *Ideas* from them to be true;) Nor was it about a *Criterion* for *the Actions of Life*, for which they thought *Probability* or *Opinion* ſufficient; but it was about finding out ſuch a *mark of truth in the Ideas of our Minds as could not agree to a Falſhood*, i. e. ſuch *an Impreſſion or Signature*, as *Cicero* expreſſes it, *as appear'd in that which was, which could not be found in that which was not.* And this was called *Viſum*, or a *true Idea*; his words are, *Quale igitur viſum? quod ex eo quod eſſet, ſicut eſſet, impreſſum eſt, ſignatum, & effectum.* The *Greeks* called it a *Comprehenſive Idea*, which they compared to Light, which diſcovers it ſelf as well as other Things. But when they came to be pinched with particular difficulties about the Natures of Things, they were never able to make out that infallible mark of Truth in their Idea; and yet this was a more likely way to have found it, than to place the grounds of Certainty in the comparing the *Agreement and Diſagreement of Ideas*, unleſs it could be made out that we have a full

Cicer. in Lucul. c. 6.

C. 24.

full ſtock of *Ideas*, and are able to diſcern and make out the *Connexion* of them with one another. For if we fail in either of theſe, the talking of Ideas and comparing thoſe which we have will do us little ſervice in finding out of Truth.

But I confeſs, the deſign in general is ſo good, that it's pity that it ſhould lie open to ſo many Objections; and much more, that it ſhould be abuſed to very bad purpoſes. But my joyning *your words with another's Application*, is that which hath given you ſo much *Offence* as to make you think it neceſſary to publiſh this *Letter* for your *Vindication.*

2. I come therefore now to ſhew *the Care* I took to prevent being miſ-underſtood; which will beſt appear by my own Words. "I muſt do that right "to the Ingenious Author of the *Eſſay* "*of Humane Underſtanding*, (from "whence theſe Notions are borrow'd "to ſerve other purpoſes than he intend-"ed them,) that he makes the caſe of "Spiritual and Corporeal Subſtances to "be alike. It was too plain, that the bold Writer againſt the *Myſteries of our Faith* took his Notions and Expreſſions

from thence, and what could be ſaid more for your Vindication, than that he turned them to other purpoſes than the Author intended them? And the true Reaſon why the *Plural Number* was ſo often uſed by me, was becauſe he built upon thoſe which he imagin'd had been your grounds, and my buſineſs was to ſhew that thoſe Expreſſions of yours, which ſeemed moſt to countenance his method of Proceeding could not give any reaſonable Satisfaction.

P. 17. But you ſay, *You do not place Certainty only in clear and diſtinct Ideas; but in the clear and viſible Connection of any of our Ideas.* And *Certainty of Knowledge*, you tell us, *is to perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, as expreſſed in any Propoſition.* Whether this be a true account of the *Certainty of Knowledge* or not, will be preſently conſider'd. But it is very poſſible he might miſtake or miſapply your Notions; but there is too much reaſon to believe, he thought them the ſame, and we have no reaſon to be ſorry, that he hath given you this occaſion for the explaining your Meaning, and for the *Vindication* of your ſelf in the matters you apprehend I had charged you with: And if your

your Anſwer doth not come fully up in all things to what I could wiſh, yet I am glad to find that in general you own *the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith*, and the *Scriptures* to be the *Foundation and Rule of it*. For thus you conclude your Book, in the laſt Paragraph of the *Poſtſcript*. *The Holy Scripture is to me, and always will be the conſtant Guide of my Aſſent, and I ſhall always hearken to it, as containing infallible Truth relating to things of the higheſt Concernment. And I wiſh I could ſay there were no Myſteries in it; I acknowledge there are to me, and I fear always will be. But where I want the Evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, becauſe God hath ſaid it: And I ſhall preſently condemn and quit any Opinion of mine, as ſoon as I am ſhewn that it is contrary to any Revelation in the Holy Scripture.* P. 226.

Which Words ſeem to expreſs ſo much of a Chriſtian Spirit and Temper, that I cannot believe you intended to give any advantage to the Enemies of the *Chriſtian Faith*; but whether there hath not been too *juſt occaſion* for them to apply them in that manner is a thing very fit for you to conſider. For in an age wherein the *Myſteries of Faith* are

ſo much expoſed by the Promoters of *Scepticiſm* and *Infidelity*, it is a thing of dangerous conſequence to ſtart ſuch new methods of *Certainty* as are apt to leave mens minds *more doubtfull* than before; as will ſoon appear from your own Conceſſions. For if the ground of Certainty be reſolved into *the Agreement and Diſagreement of the Ideas as expreſſed in any Propoſition*; is it not natural enough from hence to infer, that from whenceſoever this *Propoſition* comes, I muſt judge of it by *the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas* contained in it? You make a Diſtinction between the *Certainty of Truth* and *the Certainty of Knowledge*. The former you ſay, *Is when Words are ſo put together in Propoſitions as exactly to expreſs the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas they ſtand for*: and the latter, *When we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, as expreſſed in any Propoſition.* But our queſtion about *Certainty* muſt relate to what *we perceive*, and the means we have to judge of the Truth and Falſhood of Things as they are expreſſed to us; which you tell us, *Is by the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas in the Propoſition.* And in another place,

Book 4. Ch. 6. Sect. 3.

Where-

Where-ever we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of our Ideas, there is certain Knowledge; and when-ever we are ſure thoſe Ideas agree with the Reality of Things, there is certain real Knowledge: and then conclude, *I think I have ſhewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty, conſiſts, which, what-ever it was to others, was, I confeſs, to me heretofore, one of thoſe Deſiderata which I found great want of.* So that here is plainly a new Method of Certainty owned, and that placed in *the Agreement and Diſagreement of Ideas.* But the Author already mention'd, profeſſes to go upon the ſame grounds, and therefore it was neceſſary for me to examine them. Ch. 4. Sect. 18.

He ſaith, *That the ſimple and diſtinct Ideas we receive by Senſation and Reflection are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning*; and that *our Knowledge is in Effect nothing elſe but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Ideas.* And *that where our Perception is not immediate, our Certainty comes from the clear and viſible Connexion of Ideas.* For he ſaith, *That if the Connexion of all the intermediate Ideas be not indubitable, we can have no Certainty.* Chriſtianity not Myſt. p. 10. P. 12. P. 13.

Wherein now do his grounds of Certainty differ from yours?

But *he applies them to other Purpoſes.* I grant he doth ſo, and that was it which I had ſaid for your Vindication. But the queſtion now is, whether your general expreſſion had not given him too much occaſion for it?

It is true, that *Ch* 3. he diſtinguiſhes *the means of Information* from *the ground of Perſwaſion*; and he reckons all Authority *Divine* as well as *Human* among *the means of Information:* and the *ground of Perſwaſion* he makes to be nothing but *Evidence*; and this *Evidence*, he ſaith, lies in our *Ideas*, Ch. 4. in the *Agreement or Diſagreement of them*, p. 19. and he places *Certainty* in *our clear Perceptions of this Agreement or Diſagreement*, which you call *clear and viſible Connexion of Ideas.* And wherein then lies the difference as to the grounds of Certainty?

But his deſign is *to overthrow the Myſteries of Faith.*

This is too true. But upon what *grounds?* Is it not upon this Principle, *that our Certainty depends upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas in any Propoſition.* Now let

let the Propoſition come to us either by *Human* or *Divine Authority*: If our Certainty depends upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear *Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas contained in it*; and ſo he thought he had reaſon to reject all Myſteries of Faith, which are contained in Propoſitions, upon your grounds of Certainty.

But you ſay, you own *the infallible Truth of the Scriptures, and that where you want the Evidence of Things there is ground enough for you to believe, becauſe God hath ſaid it.* I do verily believe you, becauſe I have a far greater Opinion of your Sincerity and Integrity than I ſee reaſon for, as to the other Perſon who pretends mightily to own the Authority of Scripture at the ſame time when he undermines it. For his Words are, *The Authority of God or Divine Revelation is the Manifeſtation of Truth by Truth it ſelf, to whom it is impoſſible to lye*, p. 16. But when he comes to ſtate the point, how far we are to believe upon Divine Revelation, he hath theſe Words, *Sect.* 2. *ch.* 1. *n.* 10. The natural Reſult of what hath been ſaid is, *That to believe the Divinity*

of

of Scripture, or the Senſe of any Paſſage thereof without rational Proofs, and an evident Conſiſtency is a blameable Credulity, and a temerarian Opinion ordinarily grounded upon an ignorant and wilfull Diſpoſition. And in the next Chapter he ſaith, *That Revelation is not a neceſſitating Motive, but a mean of Information. Not the bare Authority of him that ſpeaks, but the clear Conception I form of what he ſays is the ground of my Perſwaſion.* And again, *Whoever reveals any thing, his words muſt be intelligible, and the matter poſſible. This rule holds good, let God or Man be the Revealer. As for unintelligible Relations, we can no more believe them from the Revelation of God, than from that of Man.* Sect. 2. ch. 2. n. 16. p. 42.

But what are all theſe things to you, who own, *That where you want the Evidence of things, the Authority of Revelation is ground enough for you to believe.* I do not impute them to you, but I muſt ſay, that he alledges no ground for his ſayings but your ground of Certainty: For in the ſame Page he ſaith, *That the conceived Ideas of things are the only ſubjects of Believing, Denying, Approving, and every other act of the underſtanding.*

ſtanding. All the difference we ſee is, that he applies that to *Propoſitions in Scripture*, which you affirm'd of *Propoſitions in general*, viz. that our Certainty depends upon *the clear Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas contained in them*. But I ſhall do you all the Right I can, as to this matter, by ſhewing what Reaſon I had to ſay, that *your Notions were turn'd to other purpoſes than you intended them*, and that I ſhall make appear from ſeveral paſſages in the ſame Book.

1. You own the great Defects of *Humane Knowledge*, notwithſtanding the *ſimple Ideas* we have by Senſation or Reflection. And from theſe things, B. 4. ch. 3. Sect. 23.

1. The Paucity and Imperfection of our Ideas in general; becauſe our Senſation and Reflection goes ſo little a way in reſpect of the vaſt extent of the Univerſe; and the infinite Power and Wiſdom of the Creator of it: So that what we ſee in the intellectual and ſenſible World, holds no proportion to what we ſee not: and whatever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almoſt nothing in compariſon of the reſt.

2. The

2. The want of Ideas which we are capable of, becauſe although we have Ideas in general of *Bulk*, *Figure* and *Motion*; yet we are to ſeek as to the particulars of them in the greateſt part of the Bodies of the Univerſe; although we daily ſee their Effects. And that becauſe of the Diſtance and Remoteneſs of ſome, and the Minuteneſs of others, and therefore we cannot come to a ſcientifical Knowledge in Natural Things, much leſs to that of Spiritual Beings, of which we have only ſome few and ſuperficial *Ideas*.

Sect. 24, &c.

Sect 28.

3. Want of a diſcoverable Connexion between thoſe Ideas we have. Becauſe the Mechanical Affections of Bodies have no Affinity at all with the *Ideas* they produce in us; there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulſe of any ſort of Body, and any Perception of any Colour or Smell which we find in our Minds. And ſo the Operations of our Minds upon our Bodies are unconceiveable by us; And the Coherence and Continuity of Parts of Matter; and the original Rules and Communication of Motion, are ſuch as we can diſcover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have.

4. Want

4. Want of finding out ſuch interme- Sect. 30.
diate Ideas, which may ſhew us the Agreement or Diſagreement they have one with another. And this for want of due Application of Mind in acquiring, examining and due comparing thoſe Ideas; and by ill uſe of Words, which have ſo much perplexed and confounded Mens underſtanding.

2. You own the many Failings in our Reaſon. By which you underſtand Book 4. Ch. 17. two Faculties in our Minds, *viz. Sagacity* and *Illation*; the one finding out, and the other ordering the intermediate Ideas; ſo as to diſcover the Connexion between them. But Reaſon, you ſay, Sect. 1. fails, *where our Ideas fail us*, and be- Sect. 9. cauſe of the *Obſcurity, Confuſion or Imperfection of our Ideas*, both as to Mat- Sect. 10. ter and our own Minds, and the Divine Operations; and for want of intermediate Ideas; and by proceeding upon Sect. 11. Sect. 12. falſe Principles and dubious Expreſſions.

3. As to *Propoſitions* you own theſe things;

1. Thoſe are according to Reaſon, B. 4. ch. 17. whoſe Truth we can diſcover, by exa- 1. Sect. 23. mining and tracing thoſe Ideas we have by Senſation or Reflection; and by natural

tural Deduction find to be true or probable.

2. Thoſe are above Reaſon, whoſe Truth or Probability we cannot by Reaſon derive from thoſe Principles.

3. Thoſe are contrary to Reaſon, which are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcileable to our clear and diſtinct Ideas.

4. As to *Faith* and *Divine Revelation* you own,

B. 4. ch 18. Sect. 2. 1. That Faith is the Aſſent to any propoſition, not thus made out by deductions of Reaſon, but upon the Credit of the Propoſer, as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation.

2. That things *above Reaſon* and not contrary to it, are properly Matters of Faith, and to be aſſented to on the Authority of Divine Revelation.

Thus far I have endeavoured with all poſſible Brevity and Clearneſs to lay down your Senſe about this matter. By which it is ſufficiently proved that I had reaſon to ſay, that your Notions were carried *beyond your Intention.*

P. 59. But you ſtill ſeem concerned *that I quote your Words*, although I declare, that they were uſed to other purpoſes than you intended them. I do confeſs to you, that the Reaſon of it was, that

I

I found your Notions as to *Certainty by Ideas* was the main Foundation which the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* went upon; and that he had nothing which look'd like Reaſon, if that Principle were removed; which made me ſo much endeavour to ſhew that it would not hold. And ſo I ſuppoſe the Reaſon of my mentioning your words ſo often is no longer a *Riddle* to you. P. 62.

I now proceed to other particulars of your *Vindication*.

Among other Arguments againſt this Principle of Certainty, I inſtanced in the *Being of Spiritual Subſtances within our ſelves, from the Operations of our Minds, which we do perceive by Reflection, as Thinking, Doubting, Conſidering*, &c. This Argument I yielded to be very good; but that which I urged from thence was, that it could not be from thoſe *ſimple Ideas* of the Operations of the Mind; becauſe you had affirmed that it is impoſſible for us by the Contemplation of our Ideas to be certain without Revelation that a material Subſtance cannot think. This is a point, in my apprehenſion, of great conſequence, and therefore I muſt more ſtrictly examine what you ſay in anſwer to it.

Which

P. 65. Which is, *That thinking is inconſiſtent with the Idea of Self Subſiſtence, and therefore hath a neceſſary Connexion with a Support or Subject of Inheſion*, i. e. If there be Thinking there muſt be ſomething that Thinks.

But the queſtion is, Whether that ſomething be a Material or Immaterial Subſtance? *But this Thinking Subſtance is in your Senſe a Spirit.* The queſtion I put is, Whether *Matter* can think or not? If not, then the Subſtance which thinks muſt be *Immaterial*; if it can think, then there can be no evidence from the *Idea of Thinking* to prove the Subſtance which thinks to be *Immaterial.*

This I take to be plain Reaſoning; which you muſt allow, becauſe it is about *the Agreement or Diſagreement of two ſimple Ideas*, viz. *Matter* and *Thinking.*

P. 66. But you ſay, *That the general Idea of Subſtance being the ſame every-where, the Modification of Thinking, or the Power of Thinking joyned to it makes it a Spirit, without conſidering what other Modification it has, as whether it has the Modification of Solidity or not. As on the other ſide, Subſtance, which hath the Modification*

tion of Solidity, is Matter, whether it has the Modification of Thinking or not. And therefore if I mean by a Spiritual an Immaterial Substance, you grant that you have not proved nor upon your Principles can it be demonstratively proved, that there is an Immaterial Substance in us that thinks.

I have thus set down your own Words, that you may not complain I have done you Injury. But when you put in *demonstratively proved*, I suppose you mean *in the way of Certainty by Ideas*; for concerning that our dispute is. And therefore when you add, *That you expect that I should conclude it demonstrable from Principles of Philosophy*; you must give me leave to say, this is going off from the business before us; which is about *your Principles of Certainty from Ideas*; for it was only to that purpose, that I brought this argument to prove, that we cannot from our Ideas be certain of one of the points of greatest importance, *viz.* that there is a Spiritual Substance within us; and yet the operations of our Mind are made one of the Sources of those *simple Ideas*, which are made by you the Foundation of Knowledge and Certainty. So that the Id. p. 74. 82.

point before us is, whether this Assertion of yours, *That the Power of Thinking may belong to modified Matter*, doth not overthrow your *Certainty* by *Ideas?*

No, say you, that which you are certain of by the Idea is only, *That there is in us a Spiritual Substance*, and that, you say, implies no more than a *Thinking Substance*, i. e. that by Thinking you can prove you have a Power of Thinking, which I believe may be *demonstratively proved.*

But I pray Sir, consider how this question arose, it was from your distinguishing *Spiritual* and *Corporeal Substances* from each other; and saying that *we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit as we have of a Body.* Against this I urged, that if it be possible for Matter to think, which you assert, then from the Idea of Thinking, we cannot prove the Certainty of a Spiritual Substance within us, where it is plain, that a *Spiritual Substance* is opposed to the *Power of Matter.* It is not, whether *Matter so modified can think*, but whether *Matter can think*; and let it be *modified* how it will, *Matter* is *Matter* still. *But the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit*, say you

you. But doth it ceaſe to be Matter or not? If not, then it is Matter ſtill endued with a Power of Thinking; and ſo our Idea can be no other, than of a Material Thinking Subſtance. But you ſay further, *That the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit, without conſidering what other Modifications it has, whether it hath the Modification of Solidity or not.* That is, "Although it be really a "*Material Subſtance*, yet the Modifica- "tion of Thinking makes it a *Spiritual* "*Subſtance*; for we are to go no farther "than that *Modification of Thinking*, and "from thence we are to conclude it to "be a *Spiritual Subſtance*. But we are now enquiring not into the bare *Modification of Thinking*; but whether from thence we can prove an *Immaterial Subſtance* within us, or which is all one, a *Spiritual Subſtance* as oppoſed to *Corporeal*, which is your own Diſtinction. And that I may not be thought to do you injury, I ſhall produce your own Words.

By the ſimple Ideas we have taken from our own minds— we are able to frame the complex Idea of a Spirit. And thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking, Perceiving, Liberty and Power of mov- B. 2. Ch. 23. Sect. 15.

ing themſelves, we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Subſtances, as well as material. So that here we have two things clear.

1. That a *Spirit* and *Immaterial Subſtance* are the ſame.

2. That from the *Operations of our Minds*, we have a *clear Idea* of an *Immaterial Subſtance* within us.

Sect. 17. Again you ſay, *That the primary Ideas we have of Body as contradiſtinguiſhed to Spirit, are the Coheſion of ſolid and conſequently ſeparable parts, and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulſe. Theſe you think are the Original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body.* Here *Body* is *contradiſtinguiſhed to Spirit*; and as it is ſo, *the Coheſion of ſolid and ſeparable Parts* is made one of the *original Ideas* proper and peculiar to Body *as diſtinguiſhed* from *a Spiritual Subſtance:* How then, I pray, can a *Spiritual Subſtance* conſiſt of *ſolid and ſeparable Parts*? For whatever is *ſolid*, you grant to be *conſequently ſeparable.* This ſeems to me to confound the Ideas of *Body and Spirit*, which you had taken ſo much care to diſtinguiſh; and ſo muſt deſtroy all Certainty of a Spiritual Subſtance from your *Ideas.* For although the bare

bare *ſimple Idea* of *Thinking* may be ſaid to be diſtinct from that of a *ſolid Body*; yet it is impoſſible from that *Idea* ſo explained to prove a *Spiritual Subſtance*, as diſtinct from Body. Which was the thing I intended to prove.

But you go on to compare the *Complex Idea* of *Spirit* and *Body* in theſe Words; *Let us compare then our Complex Idea of Spirit, without our Complex Idea of Body. Our Idea of Bod, is an extended ſolid Subſtance, capable of communicating Motion by Impulſe; and our Idea of our Souls is of a Subſtance that thinks and has a Power of exciting Motion in Body by Will and Thought. Theſe you think are our Complex Ideas of Soul and Body as contradiſtinguiſhed.* Here you do not ſpeak of the bare *Ideas* of *Thinking* and *Solidity*; but of the *different Subſtances*, and one is ſaid to be a *ſolid Subſtance* and the other *a Subſtance that thinks.* Sect. 22.

I ſhall add one paſſage more to the ſame purpoſe.

The Idea we have of Spirit compared with that we have of Body, ſtands thus. The Subſtance of Spirit is unknown to us, and ſo is the Subſtance of Body equally unknown to us. Here we have again *the* Sect. 30.

Subſtance of Spirit and the *Subſtance of Body* diſtinguiſhed from each other; and not the bare *Modifications*. So that I need no body to anſwer you but your ſelf. But leaſt ſuch expreſſions ſhould be thought a mere *ſlip of the Pen*; you are pleaſed again to aſſert *the Notion of*

Sect. 31. *an Immaterial knowing Subſtance to imply no more of a Contradiction than an extended diviſible Body.*

And yet after all this you confeſs,

P. 67. *That you have not proved an Immaterial Subſtance, and that it cannot be proved upon your Principles.*

What is the meaning of this? I cannot think you intended to leſſen the Authority of your Book in ſo conſiderable a part of it: And I ſhould much rather have thought the latter Paſſage a *ſlip of your Pen*, but that in your Letter you go about to defend it. Therefore I muſt attend your Motions in it.

P. 68. You ſay, *That all the great ends of Religion and Morality are ſecured barely by the Immortality of the Soul without a neceſſary ſuppoſition that the Soul is Immaterial.*

I am of opinion, that the *great ends of Religion and Morality are beſt ſecured* by the Proofs of the *Immortality of the Soul.*

Soul from its *Nature and Properties*; and which I think prove it *Immaterial*. I do not queſtion whether God can give *Immortality* to a *Material Subſtance*; but I ſay it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own Nature it is not capable of. For if the *Soul* be a *material Subſtance* it is really nothing but *Life*; or Matter put into Motion with ſuch Organs and Parts as are neceſſary to hold them together; and when Death comes, then this *Material Subſtance* ſo modified is loſt. God may by his Power grant a new Life; but will any man ſay, God can preſerve the Life of a Man when he is dead? This is a plain Abſurdity, and I think no ſuch thing tends to *preſerve Religion or Morality*.

Mr. *Hobbes* ſpeaks very conſonantly to his own Principles (although not to thoſe of *Religion* and *Morality*.) For he ſaith, *That the univerſe being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no real part of it that is not alſo a Body*. And ſo he ſaith, *That Subſtance and Body ſignifie the ſame thing, and therefore Subſtance Incorporeal are Words which deſtroy one another*. But what then is *a Spirit?* Leviath. ch. 34.

Spirit? *That*, he ſaith, *in the proper ſignification of it in common Speech, is either a ſubtle, fluid, inviſible Body, or a Ghoſt, or other Idol or Phantaſm of the Imagination.* But is there not an *Immortal Soul* in Man? *The Promiſe of Immortality*, ſaith he, *is made to the Man and not to the Soul* and *Immortal Life doth not begin in Man till the Reſurrection.* From whence it is plain, he look'd on the Soul as nothing but the *Life*; and ſo he ſaith, *That Soul and Life in Scripture do uſually ſignifie the ſame thing.* And in the Vindication of his *Leviathan*, he ſaith, *That his Doctrine is, that the Soul is not a ſeparated Subſtance, but that the Man at his Reſurrection ſhall be revived.* And he anſwers that place, *Fear not them which kill the Body, but cannot kill the Soul*; thus. *Man cannot kill a Soul, for the Man killed ſhall revive again.* I think he might as well have ſaid, *That Man cannot kill the Body*; for that ſhall be *revived* at the *Reſurrection.*

Leviath. ch. 38.

Vindicat. of Leviath. p. 90, 91.

But what is all this to you? I hope nothing at all. But it ſhews, that thoſe who have gone about to overthrow *the Immortality of the Soul by Nature*, have not been thought *to ſecure the great*

great ends of Religion and Morality.

And although we think the ſeparate State of the Soul after Death is ſufficiently revealed in Scripture, yet it creates a great difficulty in underſtanding it, if the Soul be nothing but *Life*, or a *Material Subſtance*, which muſt be diſſolved when Life is ended. For if the Soul be a *Material Subſtance* it muſt be made up as others are, *of the Coheſion of ſolid and ſeparate Parts*, how minute and inviſible ſoever they be. And what is it which ſhould keep them together, when Life is gone? So that it is no eaſie matter to give an account, how the Soul ſhould be capable of *Immortality*, unleſs it be an *Immaterial Subſtance*; and then we know the Solution of the Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul being of a different Nature.

And this is no more than what the wiſeſt and moſt intelligent *Philoſophers* have aſſerted, merely from the conſideration of the Nature and Properties of the Soul: as you very well know; and I need not for your ſake, run into ſuch a Digreſſion, (or as you call it *ſtep out of my way*) any farther, then you give occaſion for it in what follows. For you tell me, *You have great Authorities* P. 69

rities to juſtifie your uſing a Spiritual Subſtance without excluding Materiality from it. And for this you refer me to two great men indeed among the *Romans*, *Cicero* and *Virgil*. I was ſurprized at what you ſay out of *Cicero*, having been no ſtranger to his Writings about theſe matters, and I have conſulted the place you refer to; where you ſay that he oppoſes *Corpus* to *Ignis* and *Anima*, i. e. Breath; and that the Foundation of his diſtinction of the Soul from the Body is, *becauſe it is ſo ſubtle as to be out of Sight*. It is a very eaſie matter to multiply Citations out of *Cicero*; where *Spiritus* and *Anima* are both taken for Breath; but any one who will but read the very beginning of his *Tuſculan Queſtions*, may underſtand his meaning. For in the Entrance of that Diſpute he takes *Animus* for the Soul, and neither *Anima* nor *Spiritus*: and he tells us, there were two opinions about it at Death. Some held a *Diſceſſus Animi à Corpore*, a departure of the Soul from the Body, others ſaid, that the Soul never departed, but was extinguiſhed with Life: and the ſeveral opinions he ſets down at large, *Ch.* 9, 10. and then *Ch.* 11. he ſumms up the different opinions; and

ſaith

ſaith he, *If it be the Heart, or Blood, or Brain; becauſe it is a Body, it will be extinguiſhed with it: If it be* Anima, *the Vital Breath, it will be diſſipated, if it be Fire, it will be extinguiſhed.* It is true, he diſtinguiſhes here the *Vital Breath* from the *Body*; and no one queſtions ſuch a diſtinction of the Animal and Vital Spirits from the groſſer parts of the Body; but all this proceeds upon the Suppoſition of thoſe who held nothing to ſurvive after Death; but then he goes on to thoſe who held the Souls, when they are gone out of their Bodies, *to go to Heaven as their proper Habitation.* And here he plainly ſuppoſes the *Soul* not to be a *finer ſort of Body*, but of a different Nature from the Body which it leaves. *Nam Corpus quidem*, ſaith he, *quaſi vas eſt & receptaculum Animi*, C. 22. and elſewhere he calls the Body the Priſon of the Soul, *C.* 30. and ſaith, *That every wiſe Man is glad to be diſmiſſed out of the Bonds and Darkneſs of it:* and his buſineſs in the Body is *ſecernere Animum à Corpore*, to draw off the Soul from the Body; which the Philoſophers called *Commentatio mortis*, i. e. a *Continual Exerciſe of Dying*; therefore, ſaith he, *Disjungamus nos à Corporibus*

ribus, id eſt, conſueſcamus mori. Is it poſſible now to think ſo great a Man look'd on the *Soul* but as a *Modification of the Body*, which muſt be at an end with Life? Inſtead of it, there are ſeveral things very remarkable in this very Book concerning the *Immortality* of Souls by Nature;

1. He extremely deſpiſes thoſe who made the Soul a mere Mode of Matter which was extinguiſhed with Life; and he ſaith, they were *Plebeii Philoſophi*, *Ch.* 23. a mean ſort of Philoſophers, and in another place *minuti Philoſophi*, De Senect. c. 23. *who held there was no Senſe after Death.* But he repreſents *Cato* there, as weary of *the Noiſe and Filth of this World*, and *longing to go to far better Company. O præclarum diem, cum ad illud Divinum Animorum Concilium Cœtumq; proficiſcar, atq; ex hâc turbâ & colluvione diſcedam!* Did theſe men look on the Souls of Men, as mere *Modifications of Matter?*

2. He urges the *general Conſent* of *Nations* for the *Permanency* of Souls after Death. *c.* 16. and he affirms Nature it ſelf *de Immortalitate Animorum tacitè judicare*, c. 14. And I do not think the general Conſent of Mankind in this Matter,

Matter, ſo uncertain, or ſo ſlight an argument, as ſome have made it; even ſince *the late Diſcoveries:* as I think it were no hard Matter to prove; but I ſhall not here *go out of my way to do it.*

3. The moſt ancient Philoſophers of *Greece* held the ſame opinion as he ſhews from *Pherecydes*, *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, &c. c. 16, 17, &c. and they went upon far better *Reaſons* than the other, as he proves at large, *c.* 21, 22, 23.

4. That the Bodies and Souls of Men have a different Frame and Original. *Our Bodies*, he ſaith, *c.* 19. are made of *Terreſtrial Principles*; but the Souls, he ſaith, are of *a divine Original*; and *if we could give an account how they were made, we ſhould likewiſe how they were diſſolved*, c. 14. as we may of *the Parts and Contexture of Bodies*; but ſaith he, *Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri poteſt, nihil eſt enim in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum eſſe videatur*, c. 27. So that here he plainly makes a Difference between our *Bodily Subſtance*, and that of our *Souls*, which have no bodily Texture and Compoſition: becauſe there is no material Subſtance, which

can

can reach to the wonderfull Faculties and Operations of the Soul; and therefore he concludes in theſe words, *Singularis eſt igitur quædam natura atque vis animi ſejuncta ab his uſitatis notiſque naturis.* What can expreſs the Soul to be of a different Subſtance from the Body, if theſe words do it not? And preſently adds, *That the Mind is of a divine and Spiritual Nature and above Material Compoſition as God himſelf is.*

I hope this may give you ſatisfaction as to *Cicero*, how far he was from making the Soul a *Material Subſtance.* And the only place you produce out of him, *c.* 22. proves nothing but *that the Soul is Inviſible*, as you may ſee by looking upon it again.

As to *Virgil*, you quote that Expreſſion, *Dum Spiritus hos regit artus*; where it is taken for the *Vital Spirit*; which ſenſe I know no body queſtions; and ſo *Tully* expreſſes Life, *quæ Corpore & Spiritu continetur*, and oppoſes it to a Life of Immortal Fame, which he there ſpeaks of, *Pro Marcello*, *c.* 9. but the only matter in debate is, Whether they excluded any other Notion of *Spirit*, which was not done, as I have made it appear concerning *Cicero*, and ſo I ſhall of *Virgil* too. For

For ſoon after, *Æneid* 4. 385. he hath theſe Words,

Et cum frigida mors Animæ ſeduxerit Artus,
Omnibus Umbra locis adero, dabis improbe pœnas.

Which ſhews that *Virgil* did believe *the Soul* to be more than a mere *Vital Spirit*, and that it ſubſiſted and acted in a ſeparate State: And it is obſerved by *Servius*, that *Virgil* uſes *Spiritus*, *Mens* and *Animus* for the ſame. In *Æneid* 6. 726.

Spiritus intus alit, totamq; infuſa per artus.
Mens agitat molem ——

And he proves, that *Virgil* aſſerted *the Immortality of Souls*, and anſwers the arguments againſt it; and *as far as he could underſtand*, he ſaith, *that our Bodies are from the Elements and our Souls from God*; and *the Poets intention was, Ut Animos immortales diceret.* So that neither *Cicero* nor *Virgil* do you any kindneſs in this matter, being both Aſſertors of the *Souls Immortality* by *Nature.*

P. 71. *Nature.* If theſe will not do you bring me to *Scripture*, and ſay, that *Solomon himſelf ſpeaks after the ſame manner about Man and Beaſt, as the one dieth, ſo dieth the other, yea, they have all one Spirit*, Eccleſ. 3. 19. I will not diſpute about the proper Senſe of the Hebrew Word, but I muſt about *Solomon's Senſe.* For although he makes Life and Death common to *Man and Beaſt*; yet he ſaith, v. 21. *The Spirit of a Man goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beaſt goeth down to the Earth.* But you ſay, *If the Notion of a Spirit excludes Materiality then the Spirit of a Beaſt muſt be Immaterial, as well as that of a Man.* I anſwer, that although the bare *Word* doth not prove it, yet the deſign of *Solomon's* Diſcourſe doth, and ſo *the going upward of the Spirit of a Man* muſt be underſtood in a very different Senſe, from *the going downward of the Spirit of a Beaſt.* For he ſaith concerning Man, *That the Spirit ſhall return to God that gave it*, c. 12. 7. To what purpoſe? To be diſſipated in the common Air? or to be loſt in the vaſt Confuſion of Matter? no, but he concludes his Book thus; v. 14. *For God ſhall bring every Work into Judgment with every ſecret*

cret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil. If theſe be *Solomon*'s Words, as no doubt they were, and he were a Man of Senſe, and laid his ſayings together, as no doubt he did; theſe laſt Words muſt interpret the foregoing, and his other ſayings be made Conſonant to this. *Yes*, you may ſay, *This relates to the general Judgment, and not to the Soul's Subſiſtence after Death.* But *Solomon* ſpeaks of the *Spirit of a Man going upward at Death, and returning to God that gave it:* What Senſe is there in this, if it be a *Material Subſtance* which vaniſhes and is diſſolved then? And if the Soul be not of it ſelf a free, thinking Subſtance, I do not ſee what Foundation there is in Nature for a Day of Judgment. For where there is nothing but *Matter*, there is no *Freedom* of acting; where there is no Liberty, there is no *Choice*; where there is no *Choice*, there is no room for *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*, and conſequently no *Day of Judgment.* But *Solomon* poſitively concludes, there will be a Judgment to come as to *good and evil Actions* in another World, and therefore he muſt be underſtood in thoſe Expreſſions, to mean a *Free* and *Thinking*, and conſequently an *Immaterial Spirit* in us.

P. 72. But you urge farther, *That our Saviour himſelf oppoſes Spirit* to *Fleſh* and *Bones*, Luk. 24. 39. i. e. *to ſuch a groſs Compages as could be ſeen and felt.* The queſtion then was, whether it were the real Body of Chriſt or only an *Appearance* of it; and how could this be reſolved better than our Saviour doth? *Handle me and ſee, for a Spirit hath not Fleſh and Bones as you ſee me have. But he calls this a Spirit.* What follows? Therefore *a Spirit is only an Appearance*? I do not think that is your meaning. And no body queſtions but the name of *Spirits* is ſometimes given to *Apparitions.* But this is far from our caſe, which is, whether that *real Spiritual Subſtance* we find in our ſelves be *Material* or not? Doth a *Spiritual Subſtance* imply Matter in its *Idea* or not? You cannot ſay it doth: Then it may be *Immaterial:* But how come we to know things but by their diſtinct *Ideas*? Is the *Idea* of *Matter* and *Spirit* diſtinct or not? If not, to what purpoſe do we talk of Knowledge by *Ideas* when we cannot ſo much as know *Body* and *Spirit* from each other by them?

P. 73. Is it then any Abſurdity to call a *Spiritual Subſtance Immaterial*? No, you

you ſay, *You would not be thought to affirm, that Spirit never does ſignifie a purely Immaterial Subſtance; for in that Senſe the Scripture attributes the Notion of Spirit to God, and you have proved from your Principles, that there is a Spiritual Immaterial Subſtance.* And this you think proves an *Immaterial Subſtance in your way of Ideas.* But of that afterwards. We are yet upon the proving an *Immaterial Subſtance* in our ſelves *from the Ideas we have by Senſation and Reflection.* Now, I ſay, ſtill this is impoſſible if the *Spiritual Subſtance* in us *may be material.* And at laſt you grant, *That what I ſay is true, that it cannot upon theſe Principles be demonſtrated.* P. 74. Then, ſay I, *Your grounds of Certainty from Ideas* are plainly given up. P. 75. But you ſay, *it may be proved probable to the higheſt Degree.* But that is not the point; for it is not *Probability*, but *Certainty*, that we are promiſed in this *way of Ideas*; and that *the Foundation of our Knowledge* and *real Certainty lies in them*; and is it dwindled into a *Probability* at laſt? The only reaſon I had to engage in this matter was a bold Aſſertion, that *the Ideas we have by Senſation or Reflection are the ſole Matter and*

Foundation of all our Reaſoning: and that *our Certainty* lies in *perceiving the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas as expreſſed in any Propoſition*; which laſt are your own Words. How can we then be certain where we have no *Ideas* from *Senſation* or *Reflection* to proceed by? As in the preſent caſe. I have a Mind to be reſolved whether the Soul in Man be an *Immaterial Subſtance* or not; and we are to judge of the Truth of it by our *Ideas*. I ask then, What *Idea* you have of the *Soul* by *Reflection*? You anſwer, *That it is a Thinking Subſtance*. But doth this prove it *Immaterial*? You anſwer, *That you cannot be certain, but that it is very probable.* Is not this giving up the *Cauſe* of *Certainty*? But
P. 81. you ſay, *You never offer'd it as a way of Certainty where we cannot reach Certainty.* But did you not offer to put us into the *way of Certainty*? What is that, but to attain Certainty in ſuch things, where we could not otherwiſe do it? And what a ſtrange way is this, if it fails us in ſome of the firſt Foundations of the real Knowledge of our ſelves? But you ſay, *If I diſlike your way, you deſire me to ſhew you a better way of Certainty as to theſe points.*

I am ſenſible that you deſign herein, P. 81.
to draw me *out of my way to do you a kindneſs*; but I will ſo far gratifie you at this time; and to oblige you the more, I will make uſe of no other Princip'es or *Ideas*, than ſuch as I meet with in your Book; and from thence I do not deſpair of proving, that we may be certain that a *material Subſtance cannot think.*

And the method I ſhall proceed in, ſhall be to prove it, by ſuch *ways and ſteps* as you have directed me to, although you might not think to find them ſo laid together.

1. From your general Principles as to *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. You ſay, *That all our Knowledge conſiſts in the view the Mind hath of its own Ideas; which is the utmoſt Light and greateſt Certainty, we with our Faculties and in our way of Knowledge are capable of.* Here you reſolve our *Knowledge and Certainty* into *the view of the Ideas in our Minds*; therefore by thoſe *Ideas* we may come to know the Certainty of things; not in the Frame and inward Eſſence of them, as you often tell us; but by the Powers and Properties which belong to them. *Whatever*, ſay you, *be the ſe-* Book 4. Ch. 2. Sect. 1.

Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 6. 14. *cret and abſtract Nature of Subſtance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular diſtinct Subſtances, are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple Ideas* And Sect. 7. you take pains to prove, *That Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Subſtances: and their ſecondary Qualities are thoſe which in moſt of them ſerve principally to diſtinguiſh Subſtances one from* Sect. 8. *another; which ſecondary Qualities, as has been ſhewn are nothing but bare Powers.* So that our Knowledge cannot reach the inward Su' ſtance of things; and all our Certainty of Knowledge as to them, and their Diſtinction from each other, muſt depend on thoſe Powers and Properties which are known to us.

One would think ſometimes, that Sect. 12. you would allow Mankind *no more Knowledge than ſuits with the Conveniencies of Life*; but this would overthrow the great deſign of your Book, which is to put us into a way of real Certainty *by the* Book 4. Ch. 4. Sect. 18. *Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas; and where ever we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of our Ideas, there is certain Knowledge.* So that here you own we may come to a Certainty of Knowledge (which is beyond mere Proba-

Probability) and that *by perceiving the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas.*

2. If we can find the *Diſagreement* of any two *Ideas* upon your own Principles, we muſt do thoſe of *Body and Spirit.* For the *Idea of Matter* in general, you ſay, *That in Truth it contains nothing but the Idea of a ſolid Subſtance, which is every-where the ſame, every-where uniform.* And *that Body ſtands for a ſolid extended figured Subſtance.* So that *Solidity*, *Extenſion* and *Figure* are the inſeparable Properties of Bodies. And in another place you have theſe Words, *The primary Ideas we have peculiar to Bodies as contradiſtinguiſhed to Spirit, are the Coheſion of ſolid and conſequently ſeparable Parts, and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulſe. Theſe you think are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body, for Figure is but the conſequence of finite Extenſion.* Here we have the *Idea of Body* laid down by your ſelf *as contradiſtinguiſhed to Spirit.* Therefore by your own confeſſion we may perceive the Diſagreement of theſe two *Ideas* of *Body* and *Spirit*, and conſequently may certainly know their Diſtinction from each other by their inſeparable Properties. But if it be poſ-

B 3. ch. 10. Sect. 15.

B 2. ch. 23. Sect. 17.

ſible for *Matter to think*, then theſe *Ideas* muſt be confounded: Yet you diſtinguiſh the Ideas of a *Material* and *Immaterial Subſtance* in theſe Words, B. 2. ch. 23. Sect. 15. *Putting together the Ideas of Thinking and Willing, and the Power of Motion or Reſt added to Subſtance, we have the Idea of a Spirit, and putting together the Ideas of ſolid coherent Parts, a Power of being moved, joyned with Subſtance, we have the Idea of Matter. The one is as clear and diſtinct an Idea as the other; the Idea of Thinking and Moving a Body being as clear and diſtinct Ideas, as the Ideas of Extention, Solidity and being moved.* Can any thing now be plainer than the *Diſagreement* of theſe two *Ideas*, by the ſeveral Properties which belong to them? But if after all this Matter may *Think*, what becomes of theſe clear and diſtinct *Ideas*? And yet you have theſe Words, *Thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking, Perceiving, Liberty and Power of moving themſelves and other things, we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Subſtances as we have of Material.* Here it is plain, that you make Thinking and Perceiving to be part of the Complex Idea of an *Immaterial Subſtance.* How

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is this poſſible, if a *Material Subſtance* be capable of Thinking as well as an *Immaterial*? either therefore you muſt renounce your own Doctrine of Certainty by Ideas, or you muſt conclude, that Matter cannot think.

3. But I urge this yet further from your Notion of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*. *Liberty*, you ſay, *is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other. So that Liberty cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Wiſh.* And again, *Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all are neceſſary Agents.* But you make a *Power of Thinking* and *Liberty* to be parts of the *Complex Idea* of an *Immaterial Subſtance*, in the Words before cited. But what *Liberty* can you conceive in mere Matter? For you grant, *That Bodies can operate upon one another only by Impulſe and Motion*; that *the Primary Qualities of Bodies which are inſeparable from it, are Extenſion, Solidity, Figure and Mobility from any Body.* Now how can the Idea of *Liberty* agree with theſe ſimple Ideas of Body? To be *moved only by Impulſe from another Body*; and

B. 2 ch. 21. Sect. 8.

Sect. 13.

B. 2 ch. 8. Sect. 11.

Sect. 10.

and from *the free Determination of our own Thoughts*; are two Ideas as disagreeing with each other, as we can well imagine. But if Matter may *Think*, it may have *Liberty* too, because you join these together; but if it be uncapable of *Liberty* which goes along with *Thinking*, how can you imagine it should be capable of Thinking?

I argue, from your Notion of *Personal Indentity*, which you place in *self Consciousness*. For you tell us, *That a Person is a thinking intelligent Being that has Reason and Reflection; and can consider it self, as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that Consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and seems to you essential to it.* From whence it follows, that if there can be no *Self-consciousness* in Matter, then it cannot think, because it wants that which you say is Essential to it: *It being impossible, for any one to perceive, but he must perceive, that he doth perceive.* But what is there like *Self-consciousness* in Matter? Or how is it possible to apprehend that meer Body should perceive that it doth perceive? For Bodies, you say, *operate only by Impulse and Motion*; i. e. one Body

B. 2. ch. 27. Sect 9.

dy upon another. But how can a Body operate upon it ſelf without Motion? Thoſe you call the *Secondary Qualities of Bodies*, are only you ſay, *the effect of the Powers in ſome Bodies upon others endued with Senſe and Perception.* So that the effects of theſe Powers in Bodies, or of the Primary Qualities of *Bulk, Site, Figure, Motion*, &c. is not upon themſelves but upon other Bodies, either by changing thoſe Primary Qualities in them by different Site, Figure, Motion, &c. or producing thoſe Effects in us, or which we call *Senſible Qualities.* But either of theſe ways there is no poſſibility for Matter to operate upon it ſelf in a way of *Self-conſciouſneſs.* If then every intelligent thinking Being have this ſo inſeparably belonging to it, that you ſay, *It is impoſſible, for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he doth perceive*; and it be impoſſible from the *Idea* of Matter to make out that a meer Body can *perceive that it doth perceive*, I think it is more than probable in the way of Ideas that Matter cannot think.

5. I argue, from the power of *Abſtracting* which you make proper to a thinking Subſtance. This is done, ſay you, *by conſidering Ideas in the Mind as* B. 2. ch. 11. Sect. 9.

ſeparate

ſeparate from the Circumſtances of Time and Place. And this power of abſtracting, you add, *puts a perfect diſtinction between Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to.*

Sect. 10.

Letter, p. 27.

You tell me, *That you did not ſay the chief Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly, or any ways, in this that Brutes cannot abſtract; for Brutes not being able to do any thing, cannot be any Excellency of Mankind.* But I hope it is the Excellency of Mankind, that they are able to do what the Brutes cannot: And you ſay, *This puts a perfect diſtinction between Man and Brutes*; and I had thought in comparing Man and Brutes that which *put a perfect Diſtinction was the chief Excellency* with reſpect to them. But let that be as it will; the thing I inſiſt upon is, the power of *Abſtracting* following that of *Thinking* ſo cloſely that you utterly deny it to Brutes; but if it may be in the power of Matter to think, how comes it to be ſo impoſſible for ſuch Organized Bodies as the Brutes have to inlarge their Ideas by Abſtraction? *Pomponatius* thinks to avoid the Argument from Abſtraction to prove the Souls Immateriality, by ſaying, That in the moſt abſtract

De Immort. Anima. c. 9.

abſtract Speculation the Mind reſts upon Particulars; *Univerſale in ſingulari ſpeculatur.* But this doth not reach the force of the Argument; which is not, whether the Mind hath not an Eye to Particulars, when it forms Univerſal Notions; but whether the power of forming ſuch Abſtract Ideas from Particulars do not argue a Power which meer Matter can never attain to: And all that Philoſopher hath ſaid, doth not amount to the leaſt Proof of it.

6. *Laſtly*, I argue from the Reaſon you give, why God muſt be an *Immaterial Subſtance*. For theſe are the words in your Letter. *And the Idea of an Eternal, actual, knowing Being is perceived to have a Connection with the Idea of Immateriality, by the Intervention of the Idea of Matter, and of its actual Diviſion, Diviſibility and Want of Perception*, &c. Here the *want of Perception* is owned to be ſo eſſential to Matter, that God is therefore concluded to be *Immaterial*; and this is drawn from the Idea and Eſſential Properties of Matter, and if it be ſo Eſſential to it, that from thence you concluded God muſt be an *Immaterial Subſtance*, I think the ſame Reaſon will hold, as to any thinking Subſtance. Becauſe the

Let p. 139.

the Argument is not drawn from any thing peculiar to the Divine Perfections, but from the general *Idea* of Matter.

P. 73. But after all, you tell me, *That God being Omnipotent, may give to a Syſtem of very ſubtil matter, Senſe and Motion.* Your words before were, *a Power to perceive or think*; and about that, all

P. 66. our debate runs; and here again you ſay, *That the Power of Thinking joined to Matter, makes it a Spiritual Subſtance.* But as to your Argument from *God's Omnipotency*, I anſwer, That this comes to the ſame Debate we had with the *Papiſts* about the *Poſſibility of Tranſubſtantiation.* For, they never imagin'd, that a Body could be preſent after *the manner of a Spirit* in an ordinary way, but that by *God's Omnipotent* Power it might be made ſo: but our Anſwer to them was, That God doth not change the Eſſential Properties of things while the things themſelves remain in their own Nature: And that it was as repugnant for a Body to be after the manner of a Spirit, as for a Body and Spirit to be the ſame. The ſame we ſay in this Caſe. We do not ſet bounds to *God's Omnipotency*: For he may if he pleaſe, change a Body into an *Immate-*

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rial Subſtance; but we ſay, that while he continues the Eſſential Properties of Things, it is as impoſſible for Matter to think, as for a Body by Tranſubſtantiation to be preſent after the manner of a Spirit; and we are as certain of one as we are of the other. Theſe things I thought neceſſary on this occaſion to be cleared, becauſe I look on a miſtake herein to be of dangerous Conſequence as *to the great Ends of Religion and Morality: which*, you think, *may be ſecured although the Soul be allowed to be a Material Subſtance*; but I am of a very different Opinion: For if God doth not change *the Eſſential Properties of things*, their Nature remaining: then either it is impoſſible for a *Material Subſtance* to think, or it muſt be aſſerted, that a Power of thinking is within the *Eſſential Properties* of *Matter*; and ſo *thinking* will be ſuch a Mode of *Matter*, as *Spinoza* hath made it: and I am certain you do not think, he hath promoted *the great Ends of Religion and Morality.*

I ſhall now proceed to conſider the *Arguments* for proving a *Supream Immaterial Subſtance*, which you freely allow to be ſo. And my Deſign, as I ſaid,

ſaid, was to ſhew, that the certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it.

P. 87. To this you anſwer, *That Knowledge and Certainty in your Opinion, lies in the Preception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, ſuch as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and diſtinct Ideas.* But thoſe who offer at *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, bid much fairer for *Certainty* than you do; and ſpeak more agreeably to your original grounds of Certainty. For your *Relative Idea*, which you here run to again is no certainty at all from the Idea, but from the plain Evidence of Reaſon, that Accidents cannot ſupport themſelves.

P. 88.

I paſs over all which I think I have ſufficiently anſwered already; as when you ſpend ſo many Pages about *my uſing the Plural Number when your words are only mentioned*, &c. But I ſhall paſs over nothing which may ſeem to an indifferent Reader to require any farther Conſideration.

P. 101. Whether you took this *way of Ideas* from the Modern Philoſopher mentioned by you, is not at all material; but I intended no *Reflection* upon you in it (for

(for that you mean *by my commending you as a Scholar of ſo great a Maſter*) I never meant to take from you the Honour of your own Inventions; and I do believe you when you ſay, *That you wrote from your own Thoughts, and the Ideas you had there.* But many things may ſeem New to one that converſes only with his own Thoughts, which really are not ſo; as he may find when he looks into the Thoughts of other Men which appear in their Books. And therefore, although I have a juſt Eſteem for the Invention of ſuch who can *ſpin Volumes barely out of their own Thoughts*; yet I am apt to think they would oblige the World more, if after they have thought ſo much themſelves, they would examine what thoughts others have had before them concerning the ſame things, that ſo, thoſe may not be thought their own Inventions, which are common to themſelves and others. If a man ſhould try all the Magnetical Experiments himſelf, and publiſh them as his *own Thoughts*, he might take himſelf to be the *Inventor* of them; but he that examines and compares them with what *Gilbert* and others have done before him, will not diminiſh the Praiſe of his P. 103.

Diligence, but may wiſh he had compared his Thoughts with other Mens, by which the World would receive greater Advantage, altho' he loſt the Honour of being an *Original.*

P. 106. *The Matter of Certainty*, you ſay, *one cannot imploy too many Thoughts about*, viz. as to the *finding the true Grounds of it, or wherein it is placed.* This I was led to conſider, by our *Unitarians* placing it in *clear and diſtinct Ideas*; and therefore rejecting *the Myſteries of Faith*, becauſe they could not have *clear and diſtinct Ideas* of them. And one wrote purpoſely to ſhew that we were not to believe any *Myſteries in the Goſpel*, becauſe *all our Certainty depended upon the Preception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe ſimple Ideas which we have by Senſation or Reflection.* Now if theſe Principles of Certainty hold good as to all Propoſitions we can have no Certainty of Faith, where we cannot perceive the Connexion of the Ideas contained in them. I own that you ſay, *That Faith is an Aſſent to any Propoſition not made out by any Deductions of Reaſon, but upon the Credit of the Propoſer.* But this doth not clear the matter; for, is Faith an *Unreaſonable Act?* Is it not an Aſſent to

to a *Propoſition*? Then, if all *certainty* in Acts of Reaſon be derived from the *perceiving the Agreement or Diſagreement* of the Ideas contained *in it*, either there can be no *Certainty* of the Reaſonable Act of *Faith*, or the *Grounds* of *Certainty* muſt be laid ſome other way. But you ſay, *Where you want Evidence of things there is yet Ground enough for you to believe becauſe God hath ſaid it.* Which doth not yet remove the Difficulty, from the true Ground of *Certainty*; for ſay they, *Revelation is but a means of Information; and God diſcovers by that ſuch Propoſitions, which we could not have found out without Revelation; but whereever Propoſitions are offered to our Underſtandings, we muſt judge of them by our Perception of the Agreement and Diſagreement of the Ideas contained in them. And Faith doth not overthrow Nature: If therefore the Nature of Certainty lies herein we cannot be certain without it.*

It is not enough for you to diſown the Conſequence, but to ſhew that it doth not follow from *your Principles* of *Certainty:* But of this I have ſpoken already, and I love not Repetitions. I only take notice, that you Aſſert and hold to the ſame. *I ſtick to my own plain way of Certainty by Ideas.* And ſo do P. 107.

those who reject *the Mysteries of Faith*, because *not agreeable to their Ideas*, and think they proceed upon your Grounds.

But you say, *That according to my* Ib. *Rules you know not where to place Certainty*; for in the Account I give of *Des Cartes*, I have these words concerning him. "The first thing he found any "Certainty in, was his own Existence, "which he founded upon the Perception "of the Acts of his Mind. From hence "he proceeded to enquire how he came "by this Certainty, and he resolved it "into this, that he had a clear and distinct "Preception of it. And from hence he "formed his general Rule, that what he "had a clear and distinct Perception of "was true. Which in Reason ought to "go no farther, than where there is the "like Degree of Evidence; for the Cer-"tainty was not grounded on the clear-"ness of the Perception, but on the "plainness of the Evidence. Which is "of that nature that the very doubting "of it proves it, since it is impossible "that any thing should doubt or questi-"on its own being that had it not. So "that here it is not the clearness of the "Idea, but an immediate Act of Percep-"tion, which is the true ground of Cer-"tainty. And this cannot extend to

"things

" things without our ſelves, of which " we can have no other Perception, than " what is cauſed by the Impreſſion of " outward Objects. But whether we " are to judge according to thoſe Im- " preſſions doth not depend on the Ideas " themſelves, but upon the Exerciſe of " our Judgment and Reaſon about them, " which put the difference between true " and falſe, and adequate and inadequate " Ideas, ſo that our Certainty is not " from the Ideas themſelves, but from " the Evidence of Reaſon, that thoſe I- " deas are true and juſt, and conſequent- " ly, that we may build our Certainty " upon them.

Theſe I acknowledge to be my words; and yet I ſee no Reaſon why I may not *ſtick to them.* But you ſay, *That I have placed the Grounds of Certainty of our own Exiſtence, ſometimes in the plainneſs of Evidence, in oppoſition to the clearneſs of Perception; ſometimes in the immediate act of Perception in oppoſition to the clearneſs of the Idea; and the certainty of other things without us in the Evidence of Reaſon, that theſe Ideas are true and juſt in oppoſition to the Ideas themſelves; ſo that ſuch is your Dulneſs you cannot by theſe Rules tell, where to place Certainty.* P. 107.

But all theſe Miſts will eaſily be ſcattered, if you ſet your ſelf a little to conſider the Deſign of my Diſcourſe; which was not, to lay down Rules of Certainty, but to ſhew that the Grounds of Certainty from clear and diſtinct Ideas were not well laid at firſt by *Des Cartes* himſelf. Becauſe he deduced his Rule as to Certainty of other things, from the Evidence he had as to his own Exiſtence, which he had both from immediate Perception and uncontroulable Evidence, when even the Doubting of it neceſſarily proved it. But the main Queſtion was, whether this would reach to other things without us: Yes ſaid he, *the Rule will hold, where-ever there are clear and diſtinct Ideas.* But I ſay the Certainty doth not depend upon the Idea but upon inward Perception and the Evidence founded upon it; and we have not the ſame as to External Objects: For we have no inward Perception of them, nor any Evidence that reſults from our own Beings; therefore the Rule of Certainty is carried beyond the true Ground of it. I do not oppoſe in the former Caſe the *plainneſs of the Evidence* to *the clearneſs of the Perception*; but I ſuppoſe them both as to our own

Exiſtence,

Exiſtence. I ſay indeed after, that it is not the clearneſs of the Idea, but an immediate act of Perception which is the true Ground of Certainty as to our own Exiſtence; but there I take Idea as *Des Cartes* did, for the clear and diſtinct Perception of our Minds, which might reach to other Objects as well as our ſelves; and ſuch an Idea I deny is the Ground of Certainty as to our own Beings, which is founded on an immediate Act of Perception. And when they prove this as to ſuch outward Objects, which we have the Ideas of, they may then carry the Rule ſo far; but I ſay the Caſe is vaſtly different, as to a clear Perception we have from our own Acts, and that which we have as the Impreſſions from outward Objects; in the former Caſe we have ſuch an Evidence, as it is impoſſible to doubt of, but the very doubting muſt prove it: Is it the ſame as to the Ideas of External Objects? And as to theſe I do not deny, but we may come to a Certainty: but I ſay, it is not from the Ideas, which may be true or falſe, adequate or inadequate, and whether we may be certain of them or not, depends upon the Exerciſe of our Reaſon and Judgment a-

bout them. So that I found the Certainty of Ideas upon Reason, and not Reason upon the Certainty of Ideas.

And so I come more closely to consider the Argument from the *Idea* as to the Proof of a *Supream Immaterial Substance.*

If our Certainty did arise from *clear and distinct Ideas* then it must hold, where we have a *clear and distinct Idea*, as it is confessed we have concerning God. But this Argument from the Idea will not be allowed in this Case; it is *denied* by others plainly; but I do not say, that it is *denied by you*, but that it is made *a doubtfull thing.* Which comes to the same, in the point of Cer-
P. 110 tainty: and so *the force of my Argument doth by no means fail.*

P. 113. But you say, *That you intended by your words not to deny that the Idea of a most perfect Being doth prove a God, but to blame those who take it for the only proof, and endeavour to invalidate all others. For the Belief of a God being the Foundation of all Religion and genuine Morality you thought no Arguments that are made use of to work the Perswasion of a God into mens Minds should be invalida-*
P. 114. *ted, which you grant is of very ill Consequence.* Here

Here you must give me leave to ask you, what you think of the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the Being of God? Hath not this been made use of, as an Argument not only by Christians, but by the wisest and greatest Men among the Heathens? And what then would you think of one who should go about to invalidate this Argument? And that by proving, that it hath been discover'd in these latter Ages by Navigation, that there are whole Nations at the Bay of *Soldania*, in *Brasil*, in the *Caribbe Islands*, and *Paraquaria*, among whom there was found no Notion of a God, And even the Author of *the Essay of Human Understanding* hath done this. B. 1. Ch. 4 Sect 8.

This cannot be thought a *mere slip of the Pen*. For men do not quote Authors so punctually then. But if it would not be thought *stepping too much out of my way*, I think I could prove that these Instances are very ill chosen, because either they were taken from such as were not sufficiently acquainted with the People and Language of the Country; or that their Testimony is contradicted by those who have been longer among them and understood them better; or lastly

laſtly that the account given of them makes them not fit to be a ſtandard for the Senſe of Mankind, being a People ſo ſtrangely bereft of common Senſe, that they can hardly be reckoned among Mankind, as appears by the beſt accounts both of the *Cafres* of *Soldania*, and the *Caiguæ* of *Paraquaria*.

But this would be too much a *Digreſſion* in this place. I return therefore to the argument for proving the Exiſtence of God; and you may plead for your ſelf that your deſign was only to prove, *That there is no Innate Idea of a God.* But doth not this however take off from the force of an Argument ſome have uſed to perſwade Men that there is a God? I meddle not with *Innate Ideas*; but have not ſome Perſons of Note, in theſe Matters, uſed the Argument from the *Mark and Character of God imprinted on the Minds of Men* to prove his Being? And have you not ſet your ſelf to diſprove it?

Ch. 4 Sect. 12.

But I leave this, and come to the argument from the *Idea of God*, concerning which you ſay, *That though the Complex Idea for which the Word God (whether containing in it the Idea of neceſſary Exiſtence or no, for the caſe is the ſame)*

P. 119.

ſame) will not prove the real Exiſtence of a Being anſwering that Idea, any more than any other Idea in any ones mind will prove the real Exiſtence of any real Being anſwering that Idea, yet you conceive it does not hence follow, but that there may be other Ideas by which the Being of God may be proved.

And afterwards you offer *to ſhew that your Proof of a Deity is all grounded on Ideas*, i. e. *from the Ideas of our ſelves, as we are thinking Beings.* But you confeſs, that you think, that the argument from the *Idea* will *not hold*, but however you will not give up the argument from *Ideas.* Againſt which I urged your own argument, *That from the Conſideration of what we find in our ſelves and in our Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that there is an eternal, moſt powerfull, and moſt knowing Being.* All which, I ſaid, I did readily yield; but we ſee plainly, the Certainty is not placed in the *Idea*, but in good and ſound Reaſon from the Conſideration of our ſelves and our Conſtitutions. To which you reply, *That you never thought the Conſideration of our ſelves and our Conſtitutions excluded the Conſideration of*

P. 123. P. 125. P. 121.

P. 126.

of the Idea of Being or of Thinking, two of the Ideas that make a part of the Complex Idea a Man hath of himſelf. But is the Reaſon you ſpeak of, which leads us from thence to the Knowledge of an eternal, moſt powerfull, and moſt knowing Being, con ained in the Complex Idea of a Man or not? *A Complex Idea is made up of ſimple Ideas, all ſimple Ideas come in by Senſation or Reflection*; and upon comparing theſe ſimple *Ideas* our Certainty you ſay is founded. What *ſimple Ideas* then are there in Man, upon which you ground the Certainty of this Propoſition, That there is a God? I grant you, that there is a Certainty grounded upon our Beings and the Frame of our Natures; but this I ſtill ſay, is a *Certainty* of *Reaſon* and not of *Ideas*

P. 128. You ſay, *You do not well underſtand what I mean by being not placed in the Idea; for you ſee no ſuch Oppoſition, but that Ideas and ſound Reaſon may ſtand together*, i. e. *in Reaſon rightly managing thoſe Ideas ſo as to produce Evidence by them.* But what need all this great noiſe about *Ideas* and *Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas:* if after all, it comes only to this, that our *Ideas* only

only repreſent to us ſuch things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the Truth of things? But the World hath been ſtrangely amuzed with *Ideas* of late, and we have been told, that ſtrange things might be done by the help of *Ideas*, and yet theſe *Ideas* at laſt come to be only common Notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of in our Reaſoning. You ſay, *in that Chapter about the Exiſtence of God, you thought it moſt proper to expreſs your ſelf in the moſt uſual and familiar way, by common Words and Expreſſions.* I would you had done ſo quite through your Book; for then you had never given that Occaſion to the Enemies of our Faith to take up your new way of *Ideas*, as an effectual Battery (as they imagin'd) againſt the *Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith.* But you might have enjoy'd the ſatisfaction of your *Ideas* long enough, before I had taken notice of them, unleſs I had found them employ'd in doing Miſchief. P. 127.

But at laſt you tell me, *That whether I will call it placing the Certainty in the Idea, or placing the Certainty in Reaſon; or if I will ſay, it is not the Idea that gives us the Argument, but the Argument, it* P. 132.

it is indifferent to you. And if you mean no more by your *Certainty from Ideas*, but *a Certainty from Reason*, I am not such an unreasonable Man to disagree with you.

The next Argument for the Existence of God stands thus, as I have summ'd it up.

We find in our selves Perception and Knowledge. So that there is some Knowing, Intelligent Being in the World. And there must have been a Knowing Being from Eternity, or an Unknowing; for something must have been from Eternity: but if an Unknowing, then it is impossible there ever should have been any Knowledge, it being as impossible for a thing without Knowledge to produce it, as that a Triangle should make three Angles bigger than two right ones.

To which I added, that allowing the Argument to be good, yet it is not taken from the Idea, but from Principles of true Reason, as that no Man can doubt his own Perception; that every thing (we see) must have a Cause; that this Cause must either have Knowledge or not; if it have, the point is gain'd; if it hath not, nothing can produce nothing,

thing, and consequently a not knowing Being cannot produce a Knowing.

In your Answer to this, I must first take notice of your Exception to that Expression, *Allowing the Argument to be Good*; which you say, seems to imply that I thought the Argument not to be Good, which was very far from my meaning. For I had said before, *That you brought very good Arguments to prove the Existence of a God in that Chapter:* and afterwards, *That I was far from weakning the force of your Arguments.* And so I hope that Exception is removed. P. 145.

You except not, you say, *against my Arguments or Principles of Reason:* but you think still, *this is an Argument taken from Ideas:* if you will think so, I cannot help it. But you endeavour to shew, *That the very Principles you allow are founded upon Ideas:* As that a man cannot doubt of his own Perception; *This*, you say, *is by perceiving the necessary Agreement of the two Ideas of Perception and Self-Consciousness.* But I rather think, it is from that Self-Evidence which attends the immediate Perception of our own Acts, which is so great, that as S. *Augustin* observes, the Academicks had P. 136. P. 137.

Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quæ sciuntur, unum earum quæ per sen-

had nothing to say against that kind of Certainty, but only against that which arose from things convey'd by our Senses to our Mind.

seu corporis percipit animus, alterum earum quæ per seipsum, multa illi Philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus; animi autem quasdam firmissimas per seipsum perceptiones rerum verarum, quale est illud, Scio me vivere, nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt. De Trin. l. 15. c. 12.

The next Principle that every thing must have a Cause, must be understood of the Matter treated of, *i. e.* the things we see and perceive in the World. You say, *It is a true Principle that every thing that hath a Beginning must have a Cause, because by contemplating our Ideas we find that the Idea of Beginning is connected with the Idea of some Operation; and that with the Idea of something operating which we call a Cause, and so the Beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the Idea of a Cause, as is expressed in the Proposition.* Is not here a great ado to make a thing plain by *Ideas*, which was plainer without them? For is not any Man who understands the meaning of plain Words satisfied that nothing can produce it self? or, That what is not cannot make it self to be? And so the evidence doth not depend on the Agreement of the Ideas of Beginning, and Operation, and Cause;

Cauſe; but upon the Repugnancy of the contrary Suppoſition. As in that Principle, *That it is impoſſible for a thing to be and not to be at the ſame time:* If you ſay, that this depends upon the Diſagreement of the Ideas of Not-Being and Being, it will be to little purpoſe for me to ſay any more about it.

But there is one thing which deſerves to be conſider'd; which is *the Connexion between the Idea of an Eternal, Actual, Knowing Being with the Idea of Immateriality.* This was the thing I look'd for. And by what means now doth this Connexion between theſe two Ideas appear? *By the help of an Intermediate Idea.* What is that? *Even the Idea of Matter.* How ſo? The Idea of Matter you tell us, implies its *Actual Diviſion, Diviſibility, and want of Perception,* &c. *which are the Arguments you uſe in this Proof.* Are they ſo indeed? And will not the ſame Ideas prove our Souls to be Immaterial? If *want of Perception* be in the very Idea of Matter, how can Matter be made capable of Perceiving? But I find you do not always attend to the *Agreement or Diſagreement of your own Ideas.* But of this before. P. 139.

I proceed to the laſt Argument I produced to ſhew, that your Proofs of the Exiſtence of God doth not depend upon Ideas. And the Subſtance of it I thus put together. If we ſuppoſe nothing to be firſt, Matter can never begin to be; if bare Matter without Motion be Eternal, Motion can never begin to be; if Matter and Motion be ſuppoſed Eternal, Thought can never begin to be. For if Matter could produce Thought, then Thought muſt be in the Power of Matter; and if it be in Matter as ſuch, it muſt be the inſeparable Property of all Matter, which is contrary to the Senſe and Experience of Mankind. If only ſome Parts of Matter have a Power of Thinking, how comes ſo great a difference in the Properties of the ſame Matter? What Diſpoſition of Matter is requir'd to Thinking? And from whence comes it? Of which no account can be given in Reaſon. This I took to be the Force of your Argument, which I ſaid, I was far from deſigning to weaken: Only I obſerved that the Certainty of it is not placed upon clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon Reaſon diſtinct from it; which was the Thing I intended to prove.

But

But you ſay, *You do not ſee but the ſame proof may be placed upon clear and diſtinct Ideas, and upon Reaſon too.* I hope this matter is made a little clearer to you; having ſo fully ſhew'd to you before, that in the way of Ideas you can come to no Certainty about any Subſtance, but by Reaſon as it is diſtinct from the Ideas; *i. e.* as to Material Subſtances that your Certainty is reſolved into this Principle of Reaſon, that Accidents cannot ſubſiſt without a *Subſtratum.* P. 142

As to Spiritual Subſtance in us, that depends on two things,

1. That Thinking is only a Mode, and muſt ſuppoſe a Subſtance.

2. That Matter cannot think, and therefore it muſt be an Immaterial Subſtance; which I have proved from your own Principles.

As to a *Supreme Immaterial Subſtance*, the evidence depends upon this Reaſon, that Matter and Motion cannot produce Thought; and therefore an Eternal Thinking Being muſt be Immaterial. And that Matter and Motion cannot produce Thought, is proved by this Reaſon, that either it muſt be an inſeparable Property of Matter; or ſome

account in Reaſon muſt be given why ſome part of Matter ſhould think and not others. And doth not all this proceed upon Reaſon as diſtinct from Ideas?

And when I ſaid, *That the Certainty of it*, i. e. the Argument *is not placed on clear and diſtinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reaſon diſtinct from it*, I meant *the Certainty from Ideas*, although it were not ſo clearly expreſſed as it might have been; but here I obſerve you call for the *Plural Number*, which you are ſo offended with in other Parts of your Letter.

The next thing I undertook to ſhew was, that we can have no clear and diſtinct Idea of *Nature* and *Perſon* from *Senſation or Reflection*. Here you ſpend many Pages to ſhew that this doth not concern you. Let it be ſo. But it concerns the Matter I was upon; which was to ſhew that we muſt have *Ideas* of theſe things which we cannot come to by Senſation or Reflection.

My words are, I grant that by Senſation or Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things. But our Reaſon is ſatisfied, that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe

cauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reaſon, and not to mere Ideas. Still you are at it, *That you can find no Oppoſition between Ideas and Reaſon: but Ideas are the Objects of the Underſtanding, and Underſtanding is one of the Faculties imploy'd about them.* No doubt of it. But you might eaſily ſee that by Reaſon, I underſtood, *Principles of Reaſon*, allow'd by Mankind. Which I think are very different from *Ideas*. But I perceive *Reaſon* in this Senſe is a thing you have no *Idea* of, or one as *obſcure* as that of *Subſtance*. But if you ſet aſide theſe *common Principles* of *Reaſon*, your *Ideas* will ſignifie very little; and will like Accidents want a *Subſtratum* to ſupport them. P. 157.

But your Notion of *Nature* and *Perſon* deſerves to be more throughly conſider'd. Therefore to proceed more clearly in a debate of this Conſequence with reſpect to the *Doctrine of the Trinity* (what-ever you pretend to the contrary) I ſhall firſt ſet down your Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon* from your own Words, and then enter upon the Examination of them.

P. 165. As to *Nature*, you tell me in ſhort it is this, *That it is a Collection of ſeveral Ideas combined into one Complex Abſtract Idea. Which when they are found united in any Individual Exiſting, though joyned in that Exiſtence with ſeveral other Ideas, that Individual is truly ſaid to have the Nature of a Man, or the Nature of Man to be in him: for as much as all theſe ſimple Ideas are found united in him, which anſwer the Complex Abſtract Idea to which the ſpecifick name Man is given by any one; which Abſtract Specifick Idea keeps the ſame, when he applies the Specifick Name ſtanding for it, to diſtinct Individuals*, i. e. *no body changes his Idea of a Man, when he ſays*, Peter *is a Man, from that Idea which he makes the Name Man to ſtand for, when he makes* John *a Man.*

P. 216. As to *Perſon in the way of Ideas*, you tell us, *That the Word Perſon in it ſelf ſignifies nothing, and ſo no Idea belonging to it, nothing can be ſaid to be the true Idea of it; but when any Language appropriates it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Perſon and ſo of Nature.*

P. 217. *Theſe are therefore the ſigns of two Ideas they are put to ſtand for; and by enumeration all the ſimple Ideas that are contained*

ed in the Complex Idea that each of them is made to ſtand for; we ſhall immediately ſee the whole difference that is between them.

After which, you conclude, *That you muſt content your ſelf with this condemned way of Ideas, and deſpair of ever attaining any Knowledge by any other than that, or farther than that will lead you to it.*

But this muſt not hinder me from enquiring a little more ſtrictly into theſe Notions of *Nature* and *Perſon*, for if theſe hold, I do not ſee how it is poſſible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity. For if theſe terms really *ſignifie nothing in themſelves*, but are only *Abſtract and Complex Ideas*, which *the common uſe of Language hath appropriated to be the ſigns of two Ideas*; then it is plain, that they are only *Notions of the Mind*, as all *Abſtracted and Complex Ideas are*; and ſo *one Nature* and *three Perſons* can be no more.

We muſt therefore examine what your Notion is, of *Abſtracted and Complex Ideas*, and how it can be applied to *Nature and Perſon*; and whether they are *only ſigns of ſuch Ideas* as People have agreed to ſignifie by them.

To explain this, I muſt give an account, as well as I can, from your ſelf, how theſe *Abſtracted* and *Complex Ideas* come to be formed in our Minds, and what is implied in them. *The Underſtanding*, you ſay, *ſeems to you not to have the leaſt glimmering of any Ideas which it hath not by Senſation or Reflection. Theſe and their ſeveral Modes and the Compoſitions made out of them, we ſhall find contain our whole ſtock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of theſe two ways.* From hence you conſider the ſeveral ſorts of *Ideas*, *ſome Simple and ſome Complex. The ſimple Ideas are the Materials of all our Knowledge; and when the Underſtanding is once ſtored with theſe ſimple Ideas, it has the Power to repeat, compare and unite them, even to an almoſt infinite variety, and ſo can make at pleaſure new Complex Ideas: But no underſtanding can make one new ſimple Idea, not taken in by the ways before mention'd, nor can it deſtroy thoſe that are there.* After you have given an account of the *ſimple Ideas* both ways, you come to the *Faculty of Diſcerning in our Minds*, and there you reckon up, *Diſtinguiſhing Ideas*, *Comparing*, *Compounding* and *Abſtracting*. The

B. 2. ch. 1. Sect. 5.

Ch. 2. Sect. 1. Sect. 2.

Ch. 11.

The *Reaſon of Abſtraction*, you ſay, *is to have one general Name for many Particulars, or elſe Names would be endleſs. Which Abſtraction is performed by ſeparating the Ideas of particular Objects from the Circumſtances of real Exiſtence, as Time, Place*, &c. *Complex Ideas are thoſe ſimple Ideas which the Mind unites as one Idea. But ſtill it is confin'd to thoſe ſimple Ideas which it received by Senſation or Reflection, which are the ultimate Materials of all its Compoſitions.* Sect. 9. Ch. 12. Sect. 1.

Of theſe you reckon *Modes*, *Subſtances* and *Relations*. Sect. 3.

The Ideas of Subſtances are ſuch Combinations of ſimple Ideas, as are taken to repreſent particular things ſubſiſting by themſelves. And theſe are of two ſorts, one of ſingle Subſtances as they exiſt ſeparately, as of a Man, &c. *the other of ſeveral of theſe put together as an Army of Men.* Sect. 6.

In your Chapter of *Complex Ideas of Subſtances*; you affirm *the Ideas of particular Subſtances to be made by a Combination of ſimple Ideas:* and again, *that it is by ſuch Combination of ſimple Ideas as co-exiſt in ſome unknown cauſe of their Union.* Ch. 23. Sect. 3. Sect. 6, 14

That

Sect. 33. *That the Complex Ideas we have of God and ſeparate Spirits are made up of the ſimple Ideas we have by Reflection; by inlarging the Ideas we find in our ſelves.*

B. 3. ch. 3. Sect. 2. In your 3d Book you conſider *general Terms.* And the *Reaſon* of them, you ſay is *becauſe it is beyond the power of Human Capacity to frame and retain diſtinct Ideas of all Particulars. And theſe are made by way of Abſtraction from Circumſtances of Time and Place.*

Sect. 6. After which you tell us, *That General Natures are nothing but Abſtract Ideas;*

Sect. 9. *and the whole Myſtery of Genera and Species, which make ſuch a noiſe in the Schools, is nothing elſe but Abſtract Ideas with Names annexed to them.* From whence, you ſay,

Sect. 11. *it is plain, that General and Univerſal, belong not to the real Exiſtence of Things, but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Underſtanding; made by it for its own uſe and concern only*

Sect. 12. *Signs whether Words or Ideas.* And the

Sect. 14. *Abſtract Idea and the Eſſence of the Species or Genus of the ſame thing: and every diſtinct, abſtract Idea is a diſtinct Eſſence.*

But then you diſtinguiſh *the Real and*

Sect. 15. *Nominal Eſſence. The former is the Real, Internal*

Internal Conſtitution of particular things; and the Nominal is the Abſtract Idea. But there is ſo near a Connexion between them that the Name cannot be attributed to any particular Being, but what has this Eſſence, whereby it anſwers that Abſtract Idea, whereof that Name is the Sign. Sect. 16.

Theſe things you repeat and inlarge upon in ſeveral other places, but this I think is the ſubſtance of what you ſay upon this matter: For I would not willingly miſtake or miſ-repreſent your Meaning.

The Queſtion now between us comes to this, Whether the common *Nature* or *Eſſence of Things* lies only in an *Abſtract Idea*, or *a General Name*, and the Real Eſſence conſiſts only in particular Beings from which that Name is abſtracted?

The Queſtion is not, Whether in forming the Notion of Common Nature, the Mind doth not abſtract from the Circumſtances of particular Beings? But it is whether there be not an Antecedent Foundation in the Nature of things upon which we form this Abſtract Idea? For if there be, then it cannot be called *an univerſal Name* only: or a meer *ſign* of an *Idea*, which we have formed

formed from putting many ſimple Ideas together, which *Name* belongs to all of ſuch a ſort, as have thoſe *ſimple Ideas* united together. I know not how it comes to paſs, that a *Man ſpinning Books out of his own Thoughts* ſhould hit ſo luckily upon the Thoughts of another Man: I do not mean now, about clear and diſtinct Ideas, but about this Point of *univerſal Names*. For Mr. *Hobbs* in his Chapter of *Speech*, tells us, That *Names* were to ſerve for *Marks or Notes of Remembrance*, and therefore were called *Signs*. *Of theſe Names, ſome are proper and ſingular to one thing, as* Peter, John, *this Man, this Tree; ſome are common to many things, as Man, Horſe, Tree, in reſpect of all which it is called an Univerſal, there being nothing in the World Univerſal but Names; for the things nam'd, are every one of them individual and ſingular.*

Leviath. ch. 4.

One univerſal Name is impoſed on many things, for their ſimilitude in ſome Quality or other Accident; and whereas a proper Name bringeth to mind one thing only Univerſals recall any one of thoſe many.

And of Univerſals ſome are of more, or leſs Extent, the larger comprehending the

the leſs large, and ſome of equal extent, &c.

This is enough to let you ſee that theſe Notions are not ſo peculiar but that another Perſon, from his *own Thoughts* too, had ſaid much the ſame things.

But whoever ſaid or thought them firſt, we muſt examine how reaſonable theſe Thoughts are.

I know no Body that thinks now-a-days, that *Univerſals exiſt any where by themſelves*; but I do think, that there is a difference to be made between that and making them *meer Names*, or *ſigns of Ideas*.

I. And the Reaſons I go upon are theſe. In the firſt place, we are agreed, that there is a ſupream immaterial moſt perfect Being; whoſe Eſſential Attributes do not depend upon our *Arbitrary Ideas*; nor any *Names* or *Signs of Honour* we give him, nor upon the meer *Inlarging the Ideas* of our own Perfections; or ſuch as we account to be ſo in our ſelves: for we attribute thoſe to God which we are not capable of, as *Eternity* or *Neceſſary Exiſtence*, *Immutability*, &c. Herein, we take up no *Complex Ideas* from ſeveral Individuals; but

but we form a true Idea of a Divine Eſſence, from ſuch Attributes as are Eſſential to an infinitely perfect Being, which being *Infinite* is thereby, *Incomprehenſible* by us. And ſo you own, *that the great God of whom and from whom are all things is incomprehenſibly Infinite.* And *that God is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities.*

B. 2. ch. 17. Sect. 1.

II. In the next place, we look on this Supream Being, as the wiſe Creator of all things, who hath ordered the ſeveral Sorts and Ranks of Beings in the World according to his own Eternal Wiſdom; and hath given them all ſuch Properties as himſelf thought fit, whereby they are really and eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from one another; as appears by Mankind, and Brutes, and Plants. And no man that ever imploys his own Thoughts can think, that theſe are diſtinguiſhed from each other, only by an Act of our Minds.

III. Among theſe it is evident, that there are ſome things, wherein they agree; and ſome wherein they differ. They all agree in being real, created Beings, and having a ſort of Life belonging

ing to them. But they differ, that ſome have Senſe, which others have not; and ſome have Reaſon and Underſtanding which others want. And all this, is ſo plain and evident, that one might queſtion, whether thoſe had Underſtanding or not, who could think the difference of theſe from each others was not in their *Natures*, but only depended on *the ſeveral Names* that we call them by.

IV. Among the Individuals of the ſame kind, there is an Agreement in the ſame Eſſential Properties; as all *Men* in being *Rational Creatures*; and there is a Real Difference from each other in the ſeveral Accidents that belong to them; as to Time, Place, Qualities, Relations, *&c.* And no Man in his Senſes can call this in queſtion. For his moſt plain and *ſimple Ideas* will inform him of it.

V. The Queſtion now is, Whether that wherein they do all agree, be a meer *Univerſal Name* and *Abſtract Idea* or not.

It is certain, that what God created is no meer *Name* or *Idea:* It is certain, that

that God created not only *Individuals* but the *ſeveral Kinds*, with the *Differences*, which they have from each other; it is certain, that theſe *Differences* do not lie in meer *Names* or *Ideas*: How comes it then not to be certain that there is a Real Common Eſſence or Nature in the *Individuals* of the ſame kind?

But *it comes not to us in the way of Ideas.* If it be ſo, the way of *Ideas* and *Reaſon* are two different ways; and I ſhall never forſake one for the other, unleſs I could ſee better *Reaſon* for it; and even then I ſhould not; but adhere to *Reaſon* ſtill.

But now doth it appear by Reaſon, that *Nature is any thing elſe but a Collection of ſeveral Ideas combined into one Complex Abſtract Idea.*

That will be done by conſidering,

1. What theſe *Ideas* are, which are ſo collected into a *Complex Idea*; which is called *Nature.*

2. What that *Eſſence* is which is implied in this *Idea*; whether it be a *Real* or only a *Nominal Eſſence.*

1. What theſe *Ideas* are, of which this Complex Idea of Nature conſiſts; and they are ſaid to be, the *ſimple Ideas of particular Subſtances* united together, with-

without the Circumſtances of Time and Place. But thoſe ſimple Ideas may be conſidered two ways.

1. With reſpect to the *Qualities* of things, and theſe Ideas are ſaid to be *true and adequate*; but they go no farther than the Qualities; which reaches only to that Senſe of *Nature*, as it is taken for *Properties*.

2. With reſpect to the *Subject* of them, which is the *Nature* or *Subſtance* that ſupports them, and of this you confeſs we have only *imperfect and inadequate Ideas*.

As they are *true* and *adequate*; and ſo they are not the *true Repreſentations of Things without us, but of the Effects of ſuch Powers in them as produce Impreſſions in us*; which are thoſe you call *Secondary Qualities*. And in that Senſe I take your words. And of theſe I ſaid, that we can underſtand nothing really by them but the Effects they have upon us; *i. e. the Powers* and not *the Ideas*. The *Ideas* are the Impreſſions on our Minds; and by theſe we can underſtand nothing but the *Effects* which the *Powers* in outward Objects have upon us, and conſequently not the *Nature* of them. This I take to be plain Senſe. P. 169.

To this you Answer Two things;

P. 170. 1. *That we certainly know to distinguish things by Ideas, supposing them nothing but Effects produced in us by these Powers, as if they were Representations.*

P. 171. 2. *That we have certainly as much pleasure and delight by those Ideas, one way as the other.*

Granting all this to be true, what is it to the *Complex Idea of Nature*, which arises from these *simple Ideas*? *Nature is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one Complex Abstract Idea.* But the *simple Ideas* acquaint us not with the *Nature* of the *Objects*, but only with the *Powers* which are in them; by the help of *Bulk*, *Size*, *Figure* and *Motion*; which you call the *Primary Qualities*. Now *these*, you say, *are really in the things themselves; whether the Senses perceive them or not; and the Ideas of these are the true Resemblances of what exists in the Objects*; i. e. that by the Impressions we find in our selves, we are certain that there are Bodies of a determinate *Bulk*, *Size*, *Figure and Motion*: And this is all, we can by these *simple Ideas* come to, as the *Nature* of Corporeal Substances. But suppose one should ask how we can understand, the Nature of

B. 2. ch. 8. Sect. 10, 15, 17, 23.

of theſe Operations of the *Primary Qualities* in producing the *Secondary*; we are ſoon anſwered, *that there is no conceivable Connexion between them and that Reaſon cannot ſhew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure and Motion ſhould produce in the Mind, the Ideas of Blue, Yellow,* &c. Sect. 25. And ſo we are extremely helped by theſe *ſimple Ideas* in underſtanding the *Nature* of any *particular Subſtance*. For the ſenſible Qualities in us are only the Effects of certain Powers in the Objects, cauſed by their Bulk, Size, Figure and Motion; but if we ask how they are produced, we are plainly told, that our Reaſon by theſe *ſimple Ideas* can reach to no knowledge of it. And ſo we are left in as much Ignorance, as ever as to the Manner how Things without us produce Ideas in us.

But ſay you, *By theſe ſimple Ideas, we can as certainly diſtinguiſh the Beings wherein thoſe Powers are, and receive as certain Advantages from them, as if thoſe ſimple Ideas were Reſemblances.* P. 174.

As to *Advantages from them*, that is quite out of our Enquiry; which is concerning the *Idea of Nature*? as it is a Complexion of *ſimple Ideas*; and all that it amounts to is, that by theſe *ſimple I-*

deas, we underſtand the *Diſtinct Powers* in ſeveral Bodies to produce Impreſſions in our Minds; and by *the ſecondary Qualities* we find in our ſelves, we are certain of the *primary Qualities* in *Bodies*, from their different Bulk, Size, Figure and Motion. But ſtill we have nothing but an *Idea of Qualities*, which goes no farther than the Eſſential Properties; but the Idea of Nature goes farther and implies that Being wherein thoſe Qualities are; and that I ſaid, which is the ſubject of Powers and Properties is the *Nature* or *Subſtance* of it; which in this reſpect is the ſame. Have we any *Adequate Idea* of this?

To this you ſay:

P. 176. 2. *That all Ideas of Subſtances, which are referr'd to Real Eſſences are in that reſpect Inadequate.* This is what your ſelf own to be your Senſe; and is as much as I deſire. For, I pray conſider what a *fine Abſtract Complex Idea* you have given us of *Nature*. Our *Adequate Ideas* go no farther than *Qualities*, and if we enquire into the *Real Eſſence*, or *Subſtance* that ſupports them, we are told that they are *Inadequate*; and conſequently we can have no true Notion or *Idea* at all of it.

But

But you ſay farther, that you do not affirm, *That Abſtract Ideas are only general Names.* For you aſſert a *Real Eſſence* in things; *the internal unknown Conſtitution is the Real Eſſence*; *and the Abſtract Idea is the Nominal Eſſence.* P. 178.

The former you tell me, you do *readily own*; viz. *That Eſſence which is in particular Subſtances*; but the Queſtion before us is, Whether that which is in more Individuals than one, be a *Real* or only a *Nominal Eſſence.* P. 181.

2. And this is that, which we are next to Examine. To clear this, I put the Inſtance of the *Sun*, where *an Eſſence* was ſaid by you *to be in one Individual*; and yet more Suns might agree in it. In this one Sun there is a *Real Eſſence*, and not a meer *Nominal* and *Abſtracted Eſſence:* upon which I asked, If there were more Suns, would not each of them, have the *Real Eſſence* of the Sun? For what is it makes the ſecond Sun, to be a true Sun, but having the ſame *Real Eſſence* with the firſt? If it were but a *Nominal Eſſence*, then the Second would have nothing but the Name.

Here I muſt examine your Anſwer, as far as I can underſtand it: For here indeed you may complain of the want of

clear and diſtinct Ideas; but I will do what I can to explain that which I conceive to be your Senſe.

P. 190. You ſay, *This doth not at all concern the Real, but the Nominal Eſſence.*

How is this poſſible? Is there not the *Real Eſſence* of the Sun in that Individual, we call the Sun? But I put the Caſe, that there were a Multiplication of Individuals; and there were more Suns: would not each of theſe have the *Real Eſſence* of the Sun? If it were only a *Nominal Eſſence*, the reſt would have only the Name.

P. 191. But you ſay, *you did not mean the real Eſſence of the Sun was in that Individual.* How could you mean otherwiſe, when you acknowledge the *Real Eſſence* to be in *particular Subſtances*? And is not the Sun a *particular Subſtance? But the Idea of it being a Complex and Abſtracted Idea, could not be the Real Eſſence.* I anſwer, That the *Eſſence* of the Sun being communicated to another is a *Real Eſſence*; or elſe, the Second is but the *Name* and nothing elſe.

You tell me, *That you ſay expreſsly, that our diſtinguiſhing Subſtances into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their Real Eſſences.* And I think it is

is clear to any one that underſtands things, and not meer *Ideas*; that another *true Sun* muſt have the *Real Eſſence* of a Sun.

You ask, *What I mean by a true Sun.* I anſwer, That which hath the Eſſence of a Sun; and that the Name cannot be truly applied to that which hath it not. *Tes*, ſay you, *it may to any thing, which hath united in it that Combination of ſenſible Qualities, by which any thing elſe that is called Sun is diſtinguiſhed from other Subſtances*, i. e. *by the Nominal Eſſence.* So that now the *Abſtract Complex Idea* is owned to be nothing but a *Combination of Qualities* in one *Idea.*

But I muſt ſtill ask, what becomes of this Combination of Qualities in the ſecond Sun, if there be not a Real Eſſence to ſupport them? *You grant it when the ſecond Sun comes to exiſt.* And if it does not exiſt, how can it be the Second Sun?

Should it be true, ſay you, *that the Real Eſſence of the Sun were in any of the fixed Stars, yet it could not be called by us the Sun, whilſt it anſwers not our Complex Idea, or Nominal Eſſence of a Sun.* If the *Real Eſſence* of a Sun be in a fixed Star, it is really a Sun, *whether* P. 193.

you call it ſo or not; as a *Laplander* is as really a Man whatever you *call* him, if he hath the Eſſence of a Man. And it is ſtrange to me to find any Man diſpute ſuch evident things.

And ſo I come to the Inſtance of the Individuals among Men. I ſaid, that there muſt be a Real Eſſence in every Individual of the ſame kind. *Peter*, *James* and *John* are all true and real Men; not by attributing a general Name to them; but becauſe the true and real Eſſence of a Man is in every one of them.

P. 195. But you ſay, *I firſt ſuppoſe them to be Men:* no otherwiſe than as they are Individuals of the ſame kind.

Your *Weweena*, *Cuchepy* and *Couſheda* I have nothing to ſay to, they may be *Drills* for any thing I know; but *Peter*, *James* and *John* are Men of our own Country, and we know them to be ſeveral Individuals of the Race of Mankind: And what is it makes them Men, but that the true and real Eſſence of a Man is in every one of them? *Tes*,

P. 197. ſay you, *if making be taken for the Efficient Cauſe.* Whoever dreamt of a *Specifick Eſſence* being the *Efficient Cauſe*? But I ſaid, that it was the true and real Eſſence of a Man, which made every Individual

Individual a true and real Man; of which I ſaid we are as certain, as that we are Men. *That*, ſay you, *is only by our Senſes finding thoſe Properties, which anſwer the Abſtract, Complex Idea, which is in our Minds of the Specifick Idea to which we have annexed the Specifick Name Man.* I leave to you the Honour of this *Scholaſtick Language*, which is always moſt proper when there is nothing under it. I love to ſpeak plain Senſe if I can, and ſo as to be underſtood by every one that is acquainted with theſe Matters: but theſe *Specifick Names* and *Abſtract* and *Complex Ideas*, I think tend to confound Mens Apprehenſions; who can never think otherwiſe, but that every Man is ſaid to be a true *real Man*; not for any *Specifick Name*, but becauſe his *Properties* ſhew him to be endued with the *true real Eſſence of a Man.* I ſaid, that the general Idea is not made from the ſimple Ideas, but by meer Act of the Mind abſtracting from Circumſtances, but from Reaſon and Conſideration of things. P. 198.

You Reply, *That you thought Reaſon and Conſideration had been meer Acts of the Mind, when any thing was done by them.* I hope the *Ideas* you have of P. 199.

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the Acts of your own Mind, are clearer than those you have of other Mens. For it is plain, I opposed your *General and Abstract Idea by a meer Act of the Mind, to a Rational Inference* from the Nature and Properties of things. For I added; for, when I see so many Individuals, that have the same Powers and Properties, we thence inferr, there must be something common to all, which makes them of one kind; and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them of one kind and not of another, must not be a *Nominal* but a *Real Essence.* Is there now no difference between these Two Acts of the Mind, *viz. Abstraction* and *Ratiocination.*

P. 201. And you *grant, that the Inference is true.* But you say, *it doth not follow, that the general or specifick Idea is not made by the meer Act of the Mind.* Where do I deny that *Abstraction* is made by an Act of the Mind? But that is not the Question; but whether the Notion of *Essence* in Individuals of the same kind, be a meer Act of the Mind by *Abstraction*, or have a real Foundation in the Nature of Things? *i. e.* whether it be a Real or a *Nominal Essence.*

But

But you ſay, *There may be Objections to the Name of Nominal Eſſence.* My Objection is not to the *Name*, but to the Thing you underſtand by it, *viz.* that there is nothing beyond Individuals but *Names*, which utterly overthrows the Difference of *Nature* and *Perſon.* For if there be nothing really, but an individuated Eſſence, then it muſt follow, that there can be no difference of *Hypoſtaſes* in the ſame Nature: For Nature individuated muſt take in the *Hypoſtaſis*; and Nature being taken as *common* is affirmed by you to be nothing but an Abſtract and Complex Idea, and a mere Nominal Eſſence. P. 201.

You ſay, *That we cannot know the differences of things by their real Eſſences.* And what then? Do I ever deny, that the difference of kinds is to be underſtood from the different Properties? But we are not upon our Knowledge of the difference of Species, but upon the *Real* and *Nominal Eſſence.* P. 203.

And I ſhew'd that the real Eſſence doth not depend upon Complex Ideas; becauſe if men miſtake never ſo much in the Combination of Ideas, yet the ſame Eſſence remains; as I inſtanced in the Eſſence of a Man, a Horſe and a Tree. True,

P. 210. True, you ſay, *Our Thoughts or Ideas cannot alter the real Conſtitutions of things that exiſt; but the Change of Ideas can and does alter the ſignification of their Names, and thereby alter the kinds, which by theſe Names we rank and ſort them into.*

But this doth by no means reach the point, which is not concerning our *ſorting of Things*, which is by Names, but *God's ſorting* them, when he made them of different kinds. For ſo I ſaid, that the Eſſences remain always the ſame, becauſe they do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made ſeveral ſorts of Beings.

P. 212. All the Anſwer you give is this, *That the real Conſtitution or Eſſence of particular things exiſting, do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, but their being ranked into ſorts, under ſuch and ſuch Names, does depend and wholly depend upon the Ideas of Men.*

But my Argument did not proceed upon *particular things exiſting*, but upon *the ſeveral kinds of God's making*, and is it poſſible for you to think that the kinds are not of his making, but that

Men

Men only by their Ideas make the ſeveral ſorts? If ſo, I have very little hopes to remove you from your Ideas; but I am bound to do what in me lies to hinder ſuch Notions from overthrowing the *Myſteries of our Faith.*

And it is a great ſatisfaction to me to find, that theſe Notions of Ideas, as far as they tend that way, have ſo very little Foundation in Reaſon, or rather are ſo manifeſtly repugnant to them.

Before I conclude my ſelf, I muſt take notice of your *Concluſion*, viz. *That you muſt content your ſelf with this condemned way of Ideas, and deſpair of ever attaining any knowledge by any other than that, or farther than that will lead me to it.* Which is in effect to ſay, that you ſee no way to avoid *Scepticiſm* but this: but my great Prejudice againſt it is, that it leads to *Scepticiſm*, or at leaſt, that I could find no way to attain to Certainty in it upon your own grounds.

For (1.) you ſay, *That Knowledge to you ſeems to be nothing, but the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement or Diſagreement, and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it conſiſts.* Whence it unavoidably follows, that where we Book 4. Ch. 1. Sect. 1.

can

can have no *Ideas*, we can have no Knowledge.

But you go about to prove, *That there are many more Beings in the World, of which we have no Ideas, than those of which we have any; and that one holds no Proportion to the other.* So that we are excluded from any Possibility of attaining to knowledge, as to the far greatest part of the Universe for *want of Ideas*; and yet you say, *That he that will consider the infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness of the Creator of all things, will find Reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean and impotent a Creature, as he will find man to be, who in all Probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings.* And not long after, you say, *That the Intellectual World is a greater Certainly and more beautifull World, than the Material.*

Ch. 3. Sect. 23.

Sect. 27.

But whence comes this *Certainty*, where there can be no *Ideas*? Is a *general Reason* sufficient without particular Ideas? Then why not in other cases as well?

2. Suppose we have no *Ideas* of the Intellectual World, yet surely we may have as to the visible World: No, you say,

ſay, *That although we have Ideas of Bulk,* Sect. 24.
Figure and Motion in general; yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the greateſt part of the Bodies of the Univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral Powers, Efficacies and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects we daily ſee are produced. Theſe are hid from us in ſome things by being too remote, in others by being too minute.

So that you confeſs, *We can attain to* Sect. 26.
no Science, either as to *Bodies* or *Spi-* Sect. 27.
rits. And what a narrow compaſs muſt our Knowledge then be confined to? You confeſs, *We have no Ideas of the* Sect. 25.
Mechanical Affections of the minute Particles of Bodies; and this hinders our certain Knowledge of univerſal Truths concerning natural Bodies; and our Reaſon carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of Fact. Certainty and Demonſtration we muſt not in theſe things pretend to. So that all *Certainty* is given up in the *way of Knowledge*, both as to the *viſible* and inviſible World, or at leaſt, the greateſt part of them.

3. But ſtill it is to be hoped, that where we have *Ideas*, we may come to a *Certainty* in diſcerning the *Connexion between*

Sect. 28. *between them.* No, you ſay, *Another Cauſe of our Ignorance is, the want of a diſcoverable Connexion between thoſe Ideas we have.* What! are we at a loſs here too, and yet all our *Certainty* depend on *the perceiving the Agreement and Diſagreement of Ideas?* Yes, you confeſs, *That the Mechanical Affections of Bodies having no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us, we can have no diſtinct Knowledge of ſuch Operations beyond Experience. And the Operations of our Minds on our Bodies is as unconceivable.*

4. But by the help of *Intermediate Ideas,* may we not come to find out the certain Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, ſo there be *due Application* of the Mind to it? Yes, ſay you, *This may be done, and this is that we call Reaſoning, and thoſe intervening Ideas are called Proofs: and where the Agreement or Diſagreement is clearly and plainly perceived, it is called Demonſtration.* But how if this way of *Demonſtration* be made impoſſible? What benefit can we have of it in the way of Certainty: *Each ſtep,* you tell us, *That Reaſon makes in demonſtrative Knowledge muſt have intuitive*

B. 4 ch. 2. Sect. 2.

Sect. 7.

tuitive Evidence; for elſe, you ſay, that Intermediate Idea would need a Proof. And for want of this, Men often embrace Falſhoods for Demonſtrations. But if there be no way of coming to Demonſtration but this, I doubt we muſt be content without it.

5. You give no reaſonable Satisfaction in the way of *Ideas*, as to the plaineſt Evidence of Senſe concerning the Exiſtence of external Objects. For there is no *Intuition of the Mind*, nor *Demonſtration* in this Caſe; and all the evidence in your way muſt be from the *Ideas* in our Minds, which are ſuppoſed to ariſe from external Objects; but the queſtion is, how from theſe *Ideas* within our ſelves, we can prove the certain Exiſtence of Objects without our ſelves. Becauſe men may have ſuch *Ideas* in their Minds by the power of *Imagination*, when there are no Objects to produce them? You ſay, *A man is invincibly conſcious to himſelf of a different Perception, in ſeeing the Sun in the Day, and remembring it in the Night, and taſting of Wormwood and ſmelling of a Roſe, and thinking of it afterwards.* But this doth not clear the main difficulty, which is, how from Ch. 2. Sect. 14.

the *Idea* of the *Taſt of Wormwood or Smell of a Roſe* I can prove the actual Being of ſuch things without me, ſince you grant, that there is *no conceivable Connexion in Reaſon, between the Powers in the Objects and the Ideas in us:* and if there be not, how can we be certain in the *way of Ideas?* I do not ſpeak, as to *Pain or Pleaſure*, but as to the *Evidence* from the *Ideas* in our ſelves. For the moſt that you ſay is, *That a Man may perceive a very manifeſt difference between dreaming of being in a Fire, and being actually in it, becauſe of the Pleaſure or Pain that follows the Application of certain Objects; which Certainty is as great as our Happineſs or Miſery, beyond which we have no Concernment to know or to be.* But the preſent difficulty is not merely about the difference between *ſleeping and waking*; and I grant you, that a Man's being ſenſible of Fire touching him, will effectually convince him that he is not in a Dream: but the point before us is, when we are ſenſible we are awake, what it is in the *way of Ideas*, which can ſatisfie us of the real Exiſtence of external Objects. For you confeſs, *That the having the Idea of*

Ch. 11. Sect. 1.

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any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Exiſtence of that thing, than the Picture of that Man evidences his being in the World, or the Viſions of a Dream make a true Hiſtory. How then can we come to any *Certainty* in the *way of Ideas?* The Account you give is this, Sect. 2. *that the actual receiving Ideas from without, makes us know that ſomething doth exiſt at that time without us, which cauſes that Idea within us.* Which is in other terms to remove the Certainty from the *Idea* to the mere *Act* of *Senſation*: but all our Diſpute hath been not about the Certainty either of *Senſe* or *Reaſon*; (which I freely yield to) but about a particular way of *Certainty* by *the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas*; and of this I ſhew that you give no ſatisfactory Account, as to the Exiſtence of the plaineſt Objects of Senſe. For you ſay, *The Certainty lies in perceiving the Connexion between Ideas*; and here you grant, *That Reaſon cannot perceive the Connexion between the Objects and the Ideas*, how then ſhould we poſſibly attain any Certainty in the way of Ideas? So that your ſelf gives up the way of *Certainty by Ideas.*

I might eaſily purſue this matter farther; but I think this is ſufficient to let you ſee, you have no ſuch cauſe to be ſo well contented with this *condemned way of Ideas*, as you are pleaſed to call it.

And now to conclude, I am very far from being an Enemy to any free Enquiries into the *Nature* and *Reaſons* of Things, and would be glad to find any real Diſcoveries that way. And I can eaſily bear the putting of Philoſophical Notions into a modern and faſhionable Dreſs.

Let Men expreſs their Minds by *Ideas* if they pleaſe; and take Pleaſure in ſorting and comparing and connecting of them; I am not forward to condemn them; for every Age muſt have its *new Modes*, and it is very well if Truth and Reaſon be received in any Garb. I was therefore far enough from *condemning your way of Ideas*, till I found it made the only ground of Certainty, and made uſe of *to overthrow the Myſteries of our Faith*, as I told you in the beginning. This was it which made me look more narrowly into it at firſt, and now to give you this Trouble of an Anſwer to your Letter.

I

I hope that in the managing this Debate, I have not either tranſgreſſed the Rules of Civility, or miſtaken your Meaning, both which I have endeavour'd to avoid. And I return you thanks for the Civilities you have expreſſed to me through your Letter; and I do aſſure you, that it is out of no Diſ-reſpect, or the leaſt ill will to you, that I have again conſider'd this Matter, but becauſe I am farther convinced, that as you have ſtated your *Notion of Ideas*, it may be of dangerous conſequence as to that *Article* of *Chriſtian Faith*, which I endeavour'd to defend.

I am no Lover of *Controverſies*, however, I have been often engaged in them; but I have that ſatisfaction in my mind, that my deſign was to promote that, which upon my beſt Enquiries, I thought to be *Truth*; and by ſuch means as were moſt ſutable to the purſuit of it, without any Bitterneſs againſt thoſe I oppoſed. But of all *Truth*, I am convinced, that it is fitteſt for me to employ the Remainder of my Days in what concerns the Vindication of our *Holy Religion* contained in the *Scriptures*,

which gives us the only sure Grounds to hope for a *Blessed Immortality*. And in the Defence and Practice of that, I hope, by the Grace of God both to live and die.

I am, Sir,

Worcester, *March* 27. 1697.

Your Real Friend, and Humble Servant,

Edw. *Wigorn.*

Postscript.

Poſtſcript.

I Had no Thoughts of adding a *Poſtſcript* to my Anſwer, as you had done to your Letter; but before the Sheets were wrought off, there was ſent to me a new *Socinian Pamphlet*, wherein there are Reflections (and little more) on my late Treatiſe in *Vindication of the Trinity*. The reaſon I had to joyn my ſhort Animadverſions on that to theſe Papers, was the advantages he takes *from the abſtracted Notion of Nature* againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, which was the thing I told you, I apprehended to be of dangerous Conſequence in it.

But before I come to that, I cannot but take notice of their very different way of Writing from yours, which is *Grave* and *Civil*, but theirs is trifling, and too ſcurrilous in matters of Religion, for which I had ſo juſtly rebuked them before, but it ſeems to very little purpoſe: which makes me apt to think, their greateſt Hopes ſtill are in

ſuch Readers, who love to ſee Matters of Religion ridiculed; and the Perſons who are concerned to defend them expoſed to Scorn and Contempt. This was that I told them, which gave ſuch a Reliſh to their late Pamphlets, as though nothing would go down with ſuch vitiated Palats, that had not a Mixture of this *Aſſa fœtida* with it. But becauſe in the Concluſion of his Pamphlet, he charges me as well as others, with *uſing them unjuſtly as well as roughly*. I ſhall give a Taſt of this man's decent manner of Writing. The firſt thing he inſiſts upon againſt me, is, *That I openly profeſs my Method, that I will prove Firſt, then Secondly, then Thirdly, then Fourthly and Fifthly*. And what harm is there in uſing the plaineſt Method in a nice and intricate Subject? Should I go about to juſtifie this, by the Rules of the ancient and beſt Maſters of Writing in Arguments of ſuch a Nature? That would be ſhewing too much regard to ſuch pitifull Cavilling. But methinks theſe men ſhould not object this Method againſt us, of *Firſt*, *Secondly* and *Thirdly*, who had before charged us with *brutal and inexcuſable Ignorance in Counting or Numbring*. But

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he goes on. *And now beloved firſt of the firſt.* Have I any words like theſe? No matter for that. But this ſerves well enough for the *Farce*; when the deſign is to ridicule the *Form and Way of modern Sermons*; which he knew was an acceptable Subject to his *Men of Wit*, as he calls them. If they be really ſo, they cannot but deſpiſe ſuch *Fooling* in ſerious matters. And our *Modern Sermons* are ſuch, both as to the *Structure* and *Reaſon* of them, as will bear the Cenſures of Men of Judgment, (as well it may be, as of any Age) but his *Men of Wit*, who love Religion in no dreſs, will always have ſomething or other in Sermons to find fault with. And our Author was hard put to it to bring in this ſmart Reflection on *Modern Sermons* to pleaſe his Friends, which was very remote from a Debate about the Trinity.

The next thing is, (for I muſt not ſay *Secondly*) *That my Way of Writing is too obſcure; and that he could not take my Meaning under two or three Readings.* Which to pleaſe his Men of Wit, he facetiouſly expreſſes after this manner; *And when I have ſtrained my Jaws and hazarded my Teeth to break the Shell,*

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moſt commonly it proves nothing but a Shell, that I am tempted to renounce Nuts for ever. And I think he will do wiſely in it. I am certain, I was ſo far from affecting Obſcurity, that I endeavoured to put the darkeſt points into as good a Light, as I could; and I am afraid he ſometimes ſhut his Eyes, that he might complain of the darkneſs of the Room.

I dare not go ſo far as *Thirdly*; and therefore come to conſider the main parts of his Pretence to anſwer my Book.

As to the Contents of my Book, he ſaith, *I ſhew, that neither Antiquity, nor Reaſon, nor Scripture is at all for them, they are all againſt them.* Wherein he is very much in the right. And I ſhall now examine what he hath ſaid, to take off any part of the Charge.

He begins with *Antiquity*, and very fairly takes it for granted, That for 4000 Years, *The Doctrine of the* Unitarians *was the true Doctrine*: but he obſerves, *That I make the Doctrine of the Trinity to have been a part of the Cabala or* Oral *Tradition among the Jews*; upon which he cries out, *Where is Conſcience, or is Religion nothing but a Name?*

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Why, what's the matter? How comes *Conſcience* and *Religion* to be ſo deeply concerned, whether the Jews had any Anticipation of the Trinity among them? But he ſaith, *I do not believe the Jewiſh Cabala, no more than the Alcboran, and yet I produce the Authority of it:* and he adds, *That it was a Fiction of the Phariſees; and that it is a Prevarication in me to mention it as the unwritten Word of God.* I am afraid *his Cracking of Nuts* hath put him into ſome Diſorder, and made him cry out, without any other Cauſe but the Pain of his Teeth. Where did I ever give the leaſt Cauſe to ſuſpect my owning *the Jewiſh Cabala, as the unwritten Word of God?* All that I ſaid was this. The *Socinians* had ſaid, *That Chriſt was called the Word, becauſe he was the Bringer or Meſſenger of God's Word.* To which I anſwer'd, That the Jews were to underſtand it in the Senſe it was known among them: which was for *a Divine Subſiſtence*, as I proved from the *Chaldee Paraphraſt*, and the Teſtimonies of *Philo* the *Alexandrian Jew*, who lived ſo near our Saviour's time. Here is not a Word of the *Phariſaical Cabala*, which every one knows to have been about *Traditional Cuſtoms*, which they

they laid as much weight upon, as upon the Law of God, if not more. But the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* was in very great Eſteem, as giving the true Senſe of the Scripture, and for that only I produced it. And what anſwer doth he give to the Teſtimonies out of it? He ſaith, *They relate either to the Law, or to the Command of God to* Moſes, *or to the Power of God.* But I ſhew'd that *Rittangel*, who managed the Debate on this Argument with a learned *Unitarian*, proved to his plain Conviction, that theſe places could be underſtood of nothing but a *Divine Subſiſtence.* But he mightily triumphs, that the moſt pertinent Place is falſe printed; for it is ſet down, *Gen.* 20. 21. and he tells us, *There are but* 18 *Verſes in that Chapter*; but a Man of common Ingenuity would ſuſpect an Error in the Preſs in ſuch a caſe; and if he had pleaſed to have look'd on *Gen.* 28. 21. he might have have found 22 Verſes, and the Words in the 21. *Therefore*, ſaith he, *ſo much for* Chaldee *and* Cabala, *deſpiſed by all learned Men, Jews as well as Chriſtians; and never uſed but when the People are to be gulled with noiſy Nothings.* One would hardly think it poſſible ſuch mean ſtuff

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as this ſhould paſs for an anſwer, among any that pretend to Senſe or Knowledge. For how can he deny the ſenſe of the *Chaldee Paraphraſt*, when *Philo* the *Alexandrian Jew* concurs in that Interpretation, as is evident by multitudes of places in him? Did I not expreſly mention his Teſtimony as concurring with the other? Why not a word ſaid to it? Did I not add the Conſent of *Euſebius* concerning the Jews owning the Divinity of the Meſſias, till they fell off from it in oppoſition to the Chriſtians? And are theſe but *noiſy Nothings to gull People with?* Let what will become of the Diſpute between the Phariſaical Jews and the *Karaites*; thoſe who know any thing of theſe Matters, do know that I went upon other grounds; *viz.* whether the Iſraelites did receive from God an Oral Law, which they are bound to obſerve as much as the written Law, and to interpret the written Law, and the force of its obligation by it. And this I never mention'd or intended to plead for it. And as to the 13 ways of *Cabaliſtical Interpretations*, I look on them as groundleſs and frivolous things; but the thing I aimed at, was only this, There are certainly

tainly places of the Old Teſtament, which ſpeak of the Meſſias as the Son of God; *Thou art my Son*, &c. and call him Lord, *The Lord ſaid unto my Lord*. The queſtion is, what the Senſe of theſe places was, and how they are to be applied to Chriſt? Now if it appear, that the moſt ancient Jews did underſtand them in ſuch a manner, as to apply them to a *Second Subſiſtence* in the *Divinity*, we have great reaſon to follow that Senſe, which is ſo agreeable to the New Teſtament; and about this we have no manner of Reaſon to deſpiſe the Senſe of the ancient Jews, and eſpecially of the *Chaldee Paraphraſt*, who aſſerts a ſecond and a third Subſiſtence in the Divinity. And this he could not but find without *any danger to his Jaws*, was the only thing I intended.

The next thing in point of *Antiquity* which he conteſts, is about the *Nazarenes*: That Name, I ſaid, was at firſt common to all *Chriſtians*, as is plain from *Act.* 24. 5. afterwards it was applied to the Jewiſh Chriſtians at *Pella* and *Decapolis*; and to ſuch as admitted no *Gentiles* to their Communion, but kept to the Ceremonies of the Law; and of theſe I ſaid they might be all *Ebionites*;

Ebionites; but I utterly denied it of ſuch as were Members of the Catholick Chriſtian Church, as it was made up of *Jews and Gentiles*. This Diſtinction he calls a pure figment, but anſwers not one of the Reaſons I brought for it; although I proved from uncontroulable Evidence, that they made two different Bodies, had different Rules of Faith; and that the Church of *Jeruſalem* did hold the Divinity and Pre-exiſtence of our Saviour. And is all this *Cabala too, and only to be uſed when People are to be gulled with noiſy Nothings?* i. e. with empty *Pleroma's*, and ſilent Thunder-claps. The *Alogians* were theirs, for any thing I know in all reſpects; and I will give them *Theodotion*, and *Paulus Samoſatenus*, and *Photinus*. But I think not much to their comfort; the two latter were moſt certainly condemned by the Chriſtian Church; and whether the former were a mere *Jewiſh Proſelyte*, or an *Ebionite* is not worth contending about; ſince S. *Jerom* makes him to tranſlate the places about our Saviour like a Jew, and *Aquila* like a Chriſtian; which ſhews how mean an opinion he had of his Sincerity.

I proved the condemning *Paulus Samoſatenus* while they were under the power of *Zenobia*, to be a plain evidence of the ſenſe of the Chriſtian Church againſt his Doctrine; at a time when no intereſt could be ſuppoſed to ſway them. To this he gives a twofold Anſwer, (1.) *That be ſure it is falſe, that they were then under the power of* Zenobia. But how can we *be ſure it is falſe*, when I brought proof it was true, and he anſwers nothing at all to it? But it ſeems, all is *Cabala and noiſy Nothings* that ſtand in his way. (2.) He ſaith, *They were all Hereticks*. A very ſhort Anſwer. But how is this proved? For a little proof looks well ſometimes, and a man muſt not always ſay, *be ſure it is ſo*. Well, here is a plain proof; *they differ'd from the Council of* Nice *about* Homoouſios. But I had before given a full Anſwer to that, *p.* 42. to which he gives not the leaſt reply, *viz.* that they took it in two different Senſes.

As to *Lucian*, I leave it to the Readers Judgment, if he compares what I have ſaid, and what he anſwers together, and whether he thinks it probable that the *Arians* ſhould forge a Creed under his Name at *Antioch*; if he continued in the

the Doctrine of *Paulus Samoſatenus*, which was contrary to it.

This is all, he ſaith, that ſeems conſiderable in point of *Antiquity*; and whether he hath ſaid any thing really *conſiderable* about it, let the Reader judge.

Come we now to the *point of Scripture*, which is the main point in the caſe. For I had declared, *p.* 112. that our Faith as to the Trinity, is built upon that; and that there are many places of Scripture, of which no tolerable Senſe can be given without it. And therefore I examined the Senſe the *Unitarians* gave of the moſt remarkable Places, and ſhew'd the Weakneſs and Inconſiſtency of it, and then in an entire Chapter proved our Doctrine from *the Form of Baptiſm* delivered by our Saviour, as it was always underſtood in the Chriſtian Church. This I think was a very plain and eaſie Method of proving our Doctrine.

And what now ſaith our *Unitarian* to all this? Truely, I have met with few Anſwers like it. In ſhort, he ſaith, *That for his part, he is enough perſwaded without further arguing the Matter, that I have ſpent my Breath againſt a Rock.*

This is just the Popish way of answering by *Infallibility* and *super hanc Petram*. But in neither case can I see the least ground for such mighty Confidence. Alas for them! they say, *That if we write against their Interpretations of Scripture, they are not at leisure to wipe off every small Soil that may happen to be scatter'd in their Books.* Not *at Leisure!* Whence have come all those Swarms of pestilent Books which have come abroad of late Years among us, to spread their infectious Doctrine over the Nation? And now are they *not at Leisure* to defend them? And at the same time have *Leisure enough* to run into other Matters, about which there may be more Colour for Cavilling. So that this cannot be the true Reason, and I leave the Reader to judge what it is.

The last thing is the *point of Reason*; and here he finds *Leisure enough* to expatiate. But I shall keep to that point, upon which he supposes the whole Controversie to turn, which is, whether the difference between Nature and Person, which we observe in Mankind, do so far hold with respect to the Divine Nature, that it is a Contradiction to say,

ſay, there are three Perſons and not three Gods?

And there are ſeveral things I propoſed, in order to the clearing of this Matter, which I ſhall endeavour to lay down as diſtinctly as I can; and I ſhall not be *Hector'd* or *Banter'd* out of that which I account the moſt proper Method, although it happen to be too obſcure for our *Men of Wit* to underſtand without *Hazard of their Jaws.*

The *Principles* or *Suppoſitions* I lay down are theſe;

I. Nature is One and Indiviſible in it ſelf, whereever it is.

II. The more perfect any Nature is, the more perfect muſt its Unity be.

III. Whatever is affirmed of a moſt perfect Being, muſt be underſtood in a way agreeable to its Perfection.

IV. It is repugnant to the Perfection of the divine Nature, to be multiplied into ſuch Individuals as are among Men; becauſe it argues ſuch a dependence and ſeparation, as is inconſiſtent with the moſt perfect Unity.

V. To ſuppoſe three diſtinct Perſons in one and the ſame Indiviſible Divine Nature, is not repugnant to the Divine Perfections; if they be founded on ſuch relative Properties, which cannot be confounded with each other, and be in themſelves agreeable to the Divine Nature.

VI. Whether there be three ſuch diſtinct Perſons or not, is not to be drawn from our own Imaginations, or Similitudes in created Beings, but only from the Word of God, from whom alone the Knowledge of it can be communicated to Mankind.

Let us now ſee how he proves, that ſince there is no Contradiction for three Perſons to be in one common human Nature, it muſt be a Contradiction to aſſert three Perſons in the ſame divine Nature. He offers at no leſs than *demonſtrative Reaſon*, p. 58. c. 2. but I have always had the moſt cauſe to fear the Men that pretend to *Infallibility*, and *Demonſtration*. I paſs over his *Myſterious Boxes*, as Trifles fit only to entertain his *Men of Wit*, and come immediately

ately to his *demonſtrative Reaſon*, if it be to be met with. It comes at laſt to no more than this, that *Human Nature, and Angelical Nature, and Camel Nature have no Exiſtence but only in our Conception; and are only Notions of our Minds; but the Perſons in the ſame rational Being are not mere Metaphyſical Perſons or Relative Properties, but they are ſuch as neceſſarily ſuppoſe diſtinct Subſtances as well as diſtinct Properties. But in the Trinity, the Nature is a really exiſting Nature, 'tis a Spiritual Subſtance, and endued with a great number of Divine Attributes, not an abſtracted or mere notional imaginary Nature; and the Divine Perſons are not diſtinct Subſtances or real Beings, but Properties only in a real Being and in an infinite Subſtance.* This is the force of the *Demonſtration*. But now if I can make it appear, that every Nature is not only One and Indiviſible in it ſelf, but endued with Eſſential Attributes and Properties belonging to it as ſuch, then it will be evident, that Nature is not a *mere Abſtracted Notion of our Minds*, but ſomething which really exiſts ſomewhere; and then the Foundation of this *demonſtrative Reaſon* is taken away. And I appeal to any Perſons

that conſider things, whether the *Human, Angelical, and Camel Nature* (as he calls it) do not really differ from each other, and have ſuch *Eſſential Properties* belonging to them as cannot agree to any other Nature? For elſe it muſt be a mere Notion and Fiction of the Mind, to make any real difference between them. But if *Human Nature and Camel Nature* do eſſentially differ from each other, then every Nature hath its Eſſential Unity and Properties which cannot belong to any other, and that without any act of our Minds. And if every Nature is really and eſſentially different from another, it muſt have an Exiſtence ſomewhere independent on our Notions and Conceptions.

It may be ſaid, *That no ſuch Nature doth really exiſt by it ſelf, but only in the ſeveral Individuals.* But that is not the preſent Queſtion, where or how it exiſts, but whether it depend only on our Imaginations or the acts of our Minds; and if it doth ſo, then there can be no real and eſſential Difference in the Natures of Men and Beaſt, which I think none who have the Underſtanding of a Man can imagine.

But really exiſting Natures, he ſaith, *are in ſuch Perſons, as neceſſarily ſuppoſe diſtinct Subſtances, as well as diſtinct Properties; and if they exiſted only in a common Nature, as the Humanity, and had not alſo diſtinct Subſtances, they would never make diſtinct Perſons.*

I do allow, that in created and dependent Beings, there muſt be *diſtinct Subſtances* to make *diſtinct Perſons*; but he ought to have given an account what that is which makes *diſtinct Perſons neceſſarily to ſuppoſe diſtinct Subſtances*. For the Nature is One and Indiviſible in them all; or elſe every Individual muſt make a new *Species*, which is an Abſurdity I ſuppoſe he will not be fond of. If there be then one and the ſame Nature in the Individuals, whence comes *the difference of Subſtances to be ſo neceſſarily ſuppoſed?* If it be from Diverſity, Diſſimilitude, Dependence and ſeparate Exiſtence, as I aſſerted, then theſe Reaſons can hold only in created Beings; and where they cannot hold, as in the Divine Nature, why may there not be a diſtinction of Perſons founded on relative Properties, without any diſtinction of Subſtances, which is repugnant to the perfect Unity of the Godhead?

What *demonſtrative Reaſon*, nay, what probable Argument hath he offer'd againſt this?

He takes notice *p.* 60. of what I had ſaid about the diſtinction of *Perſonality* and *Perſon*; and that Perſonality is originally only a particular Mode of Subſiſtence; and a Perſon beſides the relative Property takes in the divine Nature together with it. And what *Demonſtration* have we againſt this? So far from it, that he falls to Trifling again to keep his *Men of Wit* in good Humour. *So much for Madam Perſonality, now for Sir Perſon.* Is this a decent way of Writing about theſe Matters; to begin with the Talk of *demonſtrative Reaſon*, and to end with *Burleſquing*, and turning them into Ridicule? If this be an agreeable Entertainment for his *Men of Wit*, it ſhews that they deſerve that Character, as well as he doth that of a *Demonſtrator*.

But this ſportfull Gentleman hath found ſomething elſe to play with, *viz.* that my Notion of three Subſiſtences without three Subſtances is really nothing but *Sabellianiſm*. But I had already ſaid ſo much for the clearing of this, both in the Preface and the Book it ſelf, that I need not to add one Word about it, unleſs

leſs he had ſuggeſted ſome new *demonſtrative Reaſon* to prove it. Which he is far enough from. All that he ſaith, is, *That they muſt be called Fools as well as* Sabellius, *if they aſſerted Relative Properties, or any Properties that were in no Eſſence.* But the Author of the Diſcourſe of *Real and Nominal Trinitarians*, (to whom he is no Stranger) had ſaid *That the* Sabellians *held that the Father, Son and Spirit are but only three Names of God given to him in Scripture by occaſion of ſo many ſeveral Diſpenſations towards the Creature, and ſo he is but one ſubſiſting Perſon and three Relative Perſons.* If this be true, here are *Relative Properties* indeed relating to a Divine Eſſence: but how? not as to any *Internal Relations* of *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*; but as to *External Diſpenſations*, which are another kind of *Relative Properties*.

This is all that I can find in this laſt Effort, that relates to my ſelf: As to what concerns others, they are very able to defend themſelves, and particularly as to Dr. *S.* and Dr. *Sh.* I muſt ſtill ſay I think them much his Superiours as to Wit and Learning, (for of them I ſpake without the leaſt Reſpect to my ſelf, however he makes it *a Complement to my ſelf*

and

and them, I know not for what Reason, unless it be that I speak of those against whom they had written *with Insolence and Scorn.*) But I hope they will shew themselves so much his Superiours too in Wisdom and Discretion, as not to renew their Quarrels upon his Provocations, for he doth what in him lies to inflame them; and he thought it, (and I do not blame him for it) the best service he could do to his sinking Cause.

WORCESTER,
April 26. 1697.

E. W.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

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